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Summary
Global taxes have been proposed in the past for many
reasons including financing international development
aid, reducing carbon emissions and, most recently,
restraining financial speculation. This study reviews the
more important global tax proposals that have been
made in recent years. It concludes that while many
such ideas seem inappropriate or inadequately thought
through others are worth taking seriously. However,
although good arguments can be made for taking a more
global approach to taxation the reality is that no global
governance structure that can impose such taxes exists
or is likely to emerge in the near future. Global taxation
– a dream for some and a nightmare for others – thus is,
and is likely to remain for years to come, little more than
a mirage.
But mirages are sometimes useful because they may
help motivate people to keep seeking better solutions to
real problems. The world now faces such a problem in
the fiscal area: whether and how to reform the existing
international tax regime. This study therefore also briefly
reviews the evolution of this regime with particular
attention to the question of whether the current
‘soft governance’ approach to resolving the issues
arising from the recent financial crisis issues is likely to
produce politically acceptable, technically feasible, and
economically efficient and effective results. If it does, then
perhaps this approach may also, over time, be able to
produce feasible and acceptable solutions to other global
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issues like those that underlie some of the proposals for
global taxation discussed earlier. However, if current
attempts to rethink and reshape the international tax
regime in the end fall short, as past experience suggests
is not unlikely, then perhaps, as with global taxes, the
lesson to be drawn is not that we should give up but
rather that we need to think much more about how and
in what ways the increasingly interdependent world of
the 21st century may perhaps be able to move a few
steps further down the road of slowly and painfully
adjusting its largely 19th century political structure
based on sovereign nation-states to deal with the reality
of supranational problems. Whether one begins by
searching for the mirage for global taxation or answers to
the real problems arising from the existing international
tax regime, lasting solutions appear to require either a
radical (and unlikely) change in how the world is run or,
more probably but also much more tenuously, the kind
of continual complex evolutionary process of inter-state
negotiation and compromise that may, if we are lucky,
eventually yield some kind of acceptable and perhaps
adequate solution.
Keywords: Global taxes, international taxation, taxes on
finance, carbon taxes, international governance
JEL classification: F42, F53, F68, H23, H87, Q58
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Introduction
International taxation – or its absence – has been much
in the news recently. The headline message that some
large multinational corporations have dodged national
attempts to tax corporate profits by exploiting holes and
havens in the current system of international taxation
has been heard.2 Many politicians in many countries have
promised that something will be done to fix this problem.
However, as yet it is far from clear what can or will be
done. One reason no quick or simple fix is possible is
because there is really no international tax system. What
exists are separate and different national tax systems that
incorporate features intended to deal with cross-border
flows and are often, though not always, linked through a
complex set of treaties. There is no World Tax Authority,
no World Tax Code, and no one in charge.
The fairness, efficiency and effectiveness of the
international tax system have long been cause for
concern. Beginning with the League of Nations almost
a century ago and more recently largely under the
aegis of the OECD, many attempts have been made to
rationalize and unify the bits and pieces that constitute
the international tax system. The initial motivation
behind such efforts was chiefly to alleviate the double
taxation of cross-border income flows. After decades of
negotiation between countries and between taxpayers
and the various national tax authorities, this goal was
largely achieved in the decades after World War Two. In
the process of doing so, however, inadequate attention
was perhaps paid to ensuring that international income
was being fully taxed by anyone. It is this problem –
the under-taxation of international income flows owing
to “base erosion and profit shifting” or BEPS, as the
OECD (2013, 2013a) now calls it – that has now moved
to the headlines and consequently to the top of the
international fiscal agenda.3
Certain aspects of these recent developments are
discussed in the concluding sections of this study.
However, the main subject of the study is not the current
controversy about international taxation in the sense
of the relation (or non-relation) between national tax

systems but rather the earlier (and on-going) discussion of
the possibility of truly “global” taxes. The principal focus
here is thus on the question whether there can or should
be truly global taxes and, if so, how such taxes might be
structured, administered, and their proceeds distributed.
International tax issues as such are considered only to the
extent that the process through which such issues are or
may be resolved may suggest some important lessons
with respect to the future of global taxation.
Many varieties of global taxation have been proposed
over the years.4 Some such taxes are envisaged as
worldwide, while others have a more regional focus.
Some have broad bases and others narrow bases. Some
could only be administered by a global (or regional)
body but others could be administered at the country
level (usually preferably in a coordinated manner).
The proceeds of some taxes would be kept by those
who collected them; for others the proceeds would be
allocated by some redistributive formula. Some global
taxes might take the form of surcharges on national
taxes; others are envisaged as the possible basis of a
new regional or even world tax system. Some are linked
to specific expenditure programs and their proceeds
earmarked to particular purposes. The next section
provides a brief overview of many of the global taxes that
have been proposed and attempts to separate the wheat
-- proposals worth more detailed attention -- from the
chaff -- those that have been little discussed or do not
seem worth pursuing further.
Although few think that tax issues played a major role
in the recent financial crisis,5 a common theme in the
ensuing discussion has been that new (and possibly even
global) taxes on the financial sector might both alleviate
the fiscal problems currently afflicting many countries and
reduce the likelihood of future financial crises. Several
such taxes are therefore discussed at a little more length
in the third section, followed by a section that discusses
some of the ideas for global taxes on carbon emission that
emerged in the earlier (and ongoing) debate about global
warming. A final substantive section then groups several

The discussion here focuses solely on the taxation of corporate income, which is the main subject currently under discussion in the international arena. The
somewhat less complex international problems that arise with respect to personal income taxes and taxes on transactions such as the value-added tax (VAT) are
not considered.
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For the latest from the OECD on this issue, see http://www.oecd.org/tax/beps.htm
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Useful earlier reviews of global taxes from various perspectives include Steinberg, Yager and Brannon (1978) Cline (1979), Mendez (1992, 1997, 2001), Shome
(1995), Frankman (1996), Paul and Wahlberg (2002), Wahlberg (2005), and Herman (2012). Many (not all) of these reviews are by advocates of such taxes; for a
notable exception see McMahon (2001).
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Actually, certain features common to most national tax systems – notably, the treatment of interest deductions -- have arguably have made the financial world a
bit more unstable than it would otherwise be (Alworth and Arachi 2012) although there has been surprisingly little emphasis on this point in the recent discussion.
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other proposals for global taxes of various descriptions
that have been floated at various times, often with the
aim of expanding the resources available to foster the
development of poorer countries. Two broader issues –
fiscal justice and earmarking – that come up at various
points in the preceding review of substantive global tax
proposals are then considered briefly to round off the
discussion.
As noted throughout the discussion of global taxation,
one conclusion that emerges clearly is that even the
most potentially virtuous global taxes are unlikely to be
adopted in the absence of any truly global governance
system. The final sections of the study therefore turn to
this important question.6 In particular, some lessons that
experience with reforming the international tax system -the relation between national tax systems --- suggests are
first discussed with particular attention to the question
of whether the current ‘soft governance’ approach to
resolving the issues arising from the recent financial
crisis issues is likely to produce politically acceptable,
technically feasible, and economically efficient and
effective results. If it does, then perhaps this approach
may also, over time, be able to produce feasible and
acceptable solutions to other global issues like those
that underlie some of the proposals for global taxation
discussed earlier.
In conclusion, the last two sections of the study argue
that the immediate problem is not to develop an
appropriately global fiscal solution to such big global
problems as global warming, financial instability, and
inequality. Rather, it is to develop a more encompassing
and effective institutional framework within which

to develop and implement better and more feasible
solutions to BEPS and other international tax problems.
Once such a framework is in place, the world then may
be able to deal more adequately with the basic issue
that underlies most of the proposals for global taxation
discussed here, namely, how best to provide adequate
levels of such global public goods as the environmental
commons (climate changes, etc.) and communicable
diseases (HIV/AIDs, malaria, etc.) to cite only two of the
items that a recent evaluation of the World Bank listed
as shared global challenges facing that institution (IEG
2008).7 However, if current attempts to rethink and
reshape the international tax regime in the end fall short,
as past experience suggests is not unlikely, then perhaps,
as with the issue of global taxes, the lesson to be drawn
is not that we should give up but rather that we need
to think much more about how and in what ways the
increasingly interdependent world of the 21st century
may perhaps be able to move a few steps further down
the road of slowly and painfully adjusting its largely 19th
century political structure based on sovereign nationstates to deal with the reality of supranational problems.
In short, whether one begins by searching for the
mirage of global taxation or simply for answers to the
real problems arising from the existing international tax
regime, any lasting solution appears to require either a
radical (and unlikely) change in how the world is run or,
more probably but also much more tenuously, the kind
of continual complex evolutionary process of inter-state
negotiation and compromise that may, if we are lucky,
eventually yield some kind of acceptable and perhaps
adequate solution.

The discussion of this issue draws heavily on an excellent recent review of governance with respect to international tax issues by Eccleston (2012). However,
no attempt is made here to discuss, let alone resolve, the many complex substantive issues involved in reforming the international tax regime. For a very small
sampling of the vast literature on issues in international taxation in recent decades, see e.g. Picciotto (1992), Avi-Yonah (2007), Cockfield (2010), Shaviro (2014) and
the many works cited in these studies.
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For interesting and useful discussions of these and such other candidates for global public good status as peace and equity, see the studies collected in Kaul,
Grunberg and Stern (1999), Kaul et al. (2002), and Kaul and Conceicao (2006), as well as Kaul (2012), Sandler (1997,1998, 2002) and Barrett (2007). While this
vast subject is not further discussed here, it is perhaps worth mentioning that some writers on this issue appear at times to be pushing for particular solutions
to problems that do not much resemble the theoretical concept of public goods. For example, international financial instability may be an undesirable feature
often associated with increased international capital flows. However, such instability is not simply a market failure that is a technical by-product of such flows but
seems instead to result from particular market failures that are as yet not fully understood (Wyplosz 1999). Similarly, banning even therapeutic cloning and genetic
enhancement may well be morally desirable from many perspectives, but it is not clear how such a ban can be characterized as a global public good (Barrett 2007)
when such a good is defined as an outcome that makes “people everywhere better off (Barrett 2007, 1).”

7

5

The Myth of Global Taxation
Cleaning up the real world of international taxation is
such a herculean task that it is perhaps not surprising
that some have sought simpler, more direct, and more
innovative ways to achieve such important global public
goods as environmental sustainability, financial stability,
and perhaps even peace and justice – two goals that are
arguably interconnected to the extent that the failure to
provide an adequate standard of life for many produces
political unrest and even armed conflict. An interesting
example is provided by the array of levies recently
suggested as possible sources of ‘innovative international
financing’ in UN (2012):
•

Royalties on natural resource extraction beyond
100-mile exclusive economic zones

•

Taxes on use of fossil fuels and other emission
sources

•

A “billionaire’s tax” of 1 percent of individual
wealth holdings in excess of $1 billion

•

An air passenger levy on airline tickets, with
proceeds earmarked for UNITAID8

•

A currency transaction tax collected through a
central clearing house

•

A financial transaction tax

A fuller list of such global tax proposals may be found
in Table 1. Over the years, many proposals have been
made to impose assorted global taxes and levies to
finance the activities of international agencies – often,
unsurprisingly, by such agencies themselves. Frankman
(1996) mentions, among others, the early benefitsreceived approach adopted to finance the International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal
Union (UPU), the early ability-to-pay approach suggested
for financing the League of Nations, and a variety of
proposals put forward for various purposes by such wellknown economists as James Meade (progressive taxes
based on average per capita income), Keynes (levies
on balance of payments surpluses), Jan Tinbergen (a
0.5 percent tax on selected consumer durables, as well
as taxes on non-renewable resources, on international
pollutants, a form of ‘brain drain’ tax, and a tax on
activities of transnational companies), Mahbub ul Haq (a
10 percent tax on international arms sales), and James
Tobin (a currency transaction tax).9

As Herman (2012) notes in a recent review of this
literature, although many of the earlier proposals for
various global taxes emphasized the importance of
creating an automatic source for financing international
development, this emphasis has not been nearly so
prominent in most recent discussions. One reason is
perhaps because experience has shown that countries
are reluctant to cede even the most limited taxing
authority to international organizations. Of course,
formal international organizations of various types have
long existed at both the global and the regional level
and such organizations need to be financed. Several
international organizations including the United Nations
(UN) are currently financed by levies on their member
countries. However, as Barrett (2007, 128) correctly
states, such “contributions can only be mandatory if
states agree that they are mandatory. But under these
circumstances, the amounts raised are determined
endogenously” so that in effect “…all international
financing is really voluntary.” The simple fact is that no
real global taxes have ever been imposed. Indeed, such
taxes seem most unlikely to be implemented in the near
future -- except perhaps in the face of a major, immediate,
highly visible and undeniable threat to planetary survival.
Usually long and difficult negotiations between countries
have been required to work out acceptable funding
arrangements for international organizations. Once such
arrangements have been worked out they have generally
proved to be sustainable -- indeed, almost unchangeable
-- for long periods. To cite two long-standing examples,
the International Telecommunication Union (ITU)
established in 1865 and the Universal Postal Union
(UPU) established in 1874 were both financed by banded
membership assessments, initially with countries being
grouped in seven categories, based roughly on their
level of development, and all countries grouped in the
same category paying the same share of the budget.
Illustrating the strength of institutional inertia, to this
day the contribution structure of both organizations still
resembles that negotiated long ago although it has, as
seems common, become considerably more complicated
over time, with the UPU now having 11 contribution
bands and the ITU 22. As in the beginning, however,
member states may still essentially choose to be in any
band they choose (except that the very lowest bands are
limited to the least developed countries).

UNITAID is an UN agency established under the auspices of the World Health Organization (WHO) to supply drugs to treat malaria, tuberculosis and HIV/AIDS in
developing countries.
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The last of these ideas – the subject of an interesting book (Haq, Kaul and Grunberg 1996) -- is discussed further later in the present study.

Table 1: A Catalog of Proposed Global Taxes
Taxes on the Financial Sector
•

Taxes on international currency transactions (other names -- Tobin tax, currency transaction tax, or Robin Hood
tax)

•

Taxes on financial transactions, defined in various ways (other names -- speculation tax, global financial tax,
financial tax, or financial instruments tax). Such a tax is scheduled to be introduced in some EU countries in 2014;
some countries have imposed such taxes in various forms.

•

Tax on bank balance sheets, adjusted for risk and perhaps other factors (other names --bank tax, bank levy,
financial stability contribution, or financial crisis responsibility fee). Numerous countries already impose such
taxes (see Table 2).

•

Tax on financial activities, as measured by some combination of bank profits and banker’s remuneration packages
(other names -- financial institutions tax, bankers tax)

Environmental Taxes
•

Taxes on the carbon content of fossil fuels (other names -- climate change levy, fuel tax; sometimes on narrower
bases -- coal tax, car tax, or motor fuel tax). Some of these taxes are already levied in most countries (although
many also subsidize such fuels in various ways).

•

Taxes on international transportation (other names -- aviation, shipping, international passengers) have been
proposed both as one way to tax carbon emissions and as a means to fund specific activities. A ‘solidarity
contribution’ in the form of small tax on air passenger tickets is now imposed in several countries (at different
rates and bases) with the proceeds going to a special UNITAID, an agency dealing with AIDs and certain other
diseases.

•

Taxes on international pollutants

Other Global Tax Proposals
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•

Tax on international trade. Like taxes on transnational companies and taxes on international transfers of
investment profit, trade taxes already exist in most countries but global taxes on these various activities have
also been proposed, usually to finance aid to poorer countries.

•

Tax on countries receiving international migrants (‘brain drain’), with the proceeds going to countries of origin.

•

Taxes on natural resources
-

Royalties or fees on natural resource extraction (other name – global resources dividend)

-

Taxes on economic rent from seabed mineral extraction (other name – global undersea resource royalty)

-

Taxes on non-renewable resources more generally

-

Taxes on international fisheries

•

Taxes on very high incomes

•

Tax on wealth (sometimes called billionaires’ tax).

•

Taxes on selected consumer durables (e.g. dishwashers, TVs)

•

Taxes on international arms sales (sometimes called weapons tax or gun tax)

•

Taxes on cigarettes (or tobacco). Most countries already have such taxes but a special global tax has been
proposed to finance international health programs.

•

Taxes on digital activities (other names – global internet tax, internet access tax, email tax, text or SMS tax,
franchise tax)

•

Taxes levied on countries to finance international aid and activities
-

Progressive taxes based on average per capita income

-

Taxation on basis on estimated national revenue capacity

The League of Nations established after World War I was
financed on a somewhat clearer ability to pay basis, with
country contributions being assessed on the basis of an
index based on a combination of population (with the
largest European member’s population as an upper limit)
and government revenues. Interestingly, the United
Nations which replaced and expanded the League after
World War II still receives its ‘basic funding’ (which,
however, now constitutes only 10 percent of total UN
funding) from a very similar ‘ability’ related assessment
based on Gross National Income (GNI) adjusted for per
capita income and some other factors and with upper
and lower limits. Most UN activities, however, including
the most expensive, peacekeeping, are financed largely
on a voluntary basis. All aspects of UN funding, like that
of most international organizations, continue to be a
matter of considerable political controversy and constant
negotiation.10
At the regional level, similar essentially voluntary
contributions have also been used to fund a variety of
international bodies, agencies and organizations, but
again, with one exception, none of these many and
diverse funding structures can be characterized as a
tax.11 The sole exception is the European Union (EU).
Although the EU itself has no tax administration, it has
since 1970 been largely funded by its own resources
and is not dependent on voluntary contributions from
member states. In addition to 75 percent of customs
duties12 and a progressive personal income tax on its own
employees, the EU has two additional sources of ownrevenues. Initially, the most important source was a levy
on a harmonized value-added tax (VAT) base (adjusted
to be on a comparable base) in EU member states. Like
customs duties, the EU share of national VAT collections
is collected by national tax administrations and remitted
to the EU. The rate of this levy has over the years been
reduced from the initially agreed 1 percent (raised
to 1.4 percent in 1986) to the current level of only 0.3
percent. Most of the EU tax burden imposed on member
states -- which is currently limited to a maximum of
1.23 percent of GNP -- now takes the form of a residual

assessment based (essentially) on the GNP of Member
States. As EU (2008) describes in detail, the multi-annual
financial framework is considerably more complex than
this capsule description and includes a variety of special
adjustments for particular countries. As always, who
pays exactly how much for an international organization,
whether regional like the EU or global like the UN, is a
highly political issue that invariably requires complex
negotiations between countries with differing interests
and agendas.13
The EU VAT levy takes the form of a proportional tax on
a similarly-defined consumption base. Moreover, it is
collected by existing national tax administrations, subject
to EU audit, and the proceeds of this levy are used to
fund activities that in principle benefit the entire ‘tax
community.’ Few of the key characteristics of this closest
existing approximation to an accepted global tax – a ‘fiscal
contract’ that imposes a flat rate tax on a harmonized
consumption base to finance activities that clearly
are considered to benefit those taxed (since they have
agreed both to join the EU and to pay this tax), which is
collected by existing national tax administrations (though
subject to some form of global (EU) supervision) – have
been prominent in the literature on global taxation.
Much more attention has been paid to the remote
but presumably highly desired (by the proponents of
such proposals) possibility that a supranational taxing
authority would be able to impose progressive taxes
to fund activities that will, at least in the first instance,
directly benefit others than those taxed.
In one of the earliest detailed examinations of global
taxes, for example, Steinberg, Yager and Brannon
(1978) considered a variety of such taxes that had been
mentioned in the earlier literature -- on international
trade and on international transfers of investment profits,
for example, as well as economic rents from seabed
mineral extraction.14 In addition, however, this study also
suggested that development aid (at the level set by the
then common target of 0.7 percent of GNP) could be
financed by a shadow tax to be calculated by applying
to each country a variation of the ‘representative tax

10
For some interesting (largely pro-UN) reading on this topic, see Mendez (1997) as well as other references cited in http://www.globalpolicy.org/un-finance.html.
See also the useful appraisal of UN financing in Barrett (2007).
11
Payments made on a voluntary basis for which specific benefits such as those from belonging to a particular international organization are presumably obtained
in return are not taxes as customarily defined (that is, compulsory unrequited payments to government).

The other 25 percent is kept by the collecting country. The arrangements recently negotiated to finance the EU for 2014-2020 will reduce the share of the
collecting country to 20 percent.
12

13
After over two years of negotiation, a new financial framework for the EU covering the period from 2014-2020 was recently agreed. Although the same (1.23
percent) limit on EU taxation remains and almost no changes in the financing system were made, that the discussion continues is indicated by the fact that a
special high-level group is to be appointed to investigate whether the system should be changed in the future (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-131004_en.htm).

The last of these items, as well as taxes on international fisheries (Cooper 1977), is also discussed in Cline (1979).
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system’ (RTS) familiar from the intergovernmental grants
literature.15 This calculation allocates the tax burden to
countries that are richer in terms of their capacity (ability
to pay) as measured by the estimated yield of a set of
‘standard’ taxes if levied on the relevant tax base at the
average rates applied by all countries. The RTS approach
has two advantages compared to most proposals for
global taxes: it leaves countries free to collect what
taxes they want to collect and involves no international
intrusion on national fiscal sovereignty.16 Many countries
(e.g. Canada) have used variants of this approach in
allocating equalization transfers to poorer regions.
However, few such countries have thought that the
national consensus underlying regional redistribution was
strong enough to apply the same approach to calculating
the extent to which such transfers should be financed by
richer regions. Since the politician who could extend this
approach to the global level has not been born it is not
surprising that, like all attempts to develop an acceptable
automatic redistributive formula for global taxation, this
proposal never advanced beyond the idea stage.
Indeed, as Frankman (1996, 807) concluded some years
ago that “at the global level, discussion of an organized
system of redistribution has not yet made its way to the
negotiating table in any meaningful sense.” The same
is true today. Frankman (1996, 809) attributed this
reality in part to “…the continuing stumbling block of

sovereign agreement to grant revenue-raising authority
to supranational bodies” and went on to note that,
since “a global economy requires structures of global
governance” one must first solve that small problem
before being able to resolve the issue of “financing global
order and development through international taxation”
(Frankman, 1996, 815). The prognosis for extensively
redistributive global tax schemes is thus bleak. This
is not surprising since any sustainable supranational
system must not only provide net benefits (gains from
membership less costs of membership) for all member
countries as a whole but also provide a net benefit for
each and every member if it is to be rational for them to
participate in what is, as Barrett (2007) emphasizes, an
inherently voluntary system.17 Countries find it difficult
enough to build and maintain a sustainable consensus
on interjurisdictional distribution within their own
boundaries. To do so across and between countries is
inevitably a much more demanding task. Nonetheless,
as discussed further below, the fact that what some
consider morally desirable is unlikely to be achieved in
the near future does not imply that nothing can be done
to improve matters with respect to either international
taxation or the challenges of global public goods. As
always, our inability to achieve perfection should not
deter us from trying to do better.

Bahl (1972) had earlier used a similar approach in the international context in a pioneering paper on measuring tax effort across countries. In fact, however, an
alternative approach based on regression analysis (Bahl 1971) subsequently came to dominate this literature: for a recent analysis, see Fennochietto and Pessino
(2013).
15

16
In another interesting early contribution, Dosser (1963) suggested that the burden of international aid should be allocated not on the basis of average per capita
income but rather on the basis of increases in per capita income on the (perhaps overly optimistic) assumption that giving up a potential improvement in income
rather than reducing existing income might make such a global tax approach more politically acceptable.

This is a brief summary of arguments developed at length in e.g. Sandler (1998) and Barrett (2007).
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Global Taxes on Finance
One global public good (GPG) that has been much
discussed recently is international financial stability.
Whether or not this is a GPG,18 a number of corrective
tax proposals were put forward during several recent
international summit meetings concerned with this
problem.19 The taxes that drew most attention in
this discussion were three – the Financial Stability
Contribution (FSC), the Financial Transactions Tax (FTT)
and the Financial Activities Tax (FAT). This section takes
a closer look at these three as well as an earlier and still
live suggestion for a special type of FTT, the currency
transaction tax (CTT).20
An IMF (2010) report to the G-20 concluded that two
of these taxes in particular – the FSC and the FAT-warranted careful consideration. In a comment on this
report, a former senior Fund official suggested that, while
something like the FSC may indeed make sense as a way
of reducing the existing implicit subsidy in many countries
to excessive risk-taking by many financial institutions, the
FAT – as is perhaps suggested by its acronym – seems to
be more a reaction to populist politics than a sensible
policy (Rogoff 2010). Not much has been heard about
the FAT recently, but the FTT has been much discussed
in both the financial and the popular media. As IMF
(2010) stresses, cumulative taxes like the FTT which tax
transactions between businesses are particularly difficult
to analyze because of their complex and uncertain effects
on business decisions. Since such problems with turnover
taxes are one of the main reasons for the (almost) worldwide adoption of the VAT, it is not obvious why countries
would want to replicate one of the main defects of
such taxes by introducing an FTT. Indeed, one reason
IMF (2010) preferred the FAT to the FTT was precisely
because the former, unlike the latter, is analogous to the
(more efficient) VAT. In any case, in practice the financial

tax of choice for most countries so far appears to have
been some variety of the relatively neglected FSC – the
bank tax.

Taxing Banks
Like most financial sector taxes, the FSC is an idea that
has surfaced in different countries with many variants
and under many different names including Bank Tax,
Bank Levy, Financial Bailout Levy and Financial Crisis
Responsibility Fee, all of which are henceforth referred to
simply as bank taxes. IMF (2010) suggests that the best
bank tax is a flat tax imposed on the balance sheets of
financial institutions, preferably with rates varying with
the assessed riskiness of the portfolio. Some of the many
proposals made along these lines in both global forums
and national discussions have suggested that the proceeds
of any such tax should be earmarked to an insurance fund
to bail the contributing institutions out in any future crisis
rather than making taxpayers pay for bailouts. As Table
2 illustrates, taxes more or less like the FSC have proved
to be a popular response to the financial crisis, especially
in Europe.21 However, as Table 2 also makes clear, almost
every country has imposed a somewhat different variant
of the FSC, and there is little harmonization to be seen
anywhere. Some of the countries included in Table 2, like
others that have not imposed such bank taxes, have also
sought similar results -- minus the revenue -- through
various reforms in financial regulation and especially in
capital requirements for financial institutions.22
In contrast to the FSC approach, which essentially taxes
some balance sheet characteristic, a Financial Activities
Tax (FAT) is a tax imposed on some combination of bank
profits and bankers’ remuneration packages. Other labels
that have been used for such levies include Financial
Institutions Tax (FIT) and Bankers Tax. Rogoff (2010)

18
Although, as Wyplosz (1999) notes, from one perspective international financial instability may be considered a public bad (a negative externality imposed on
all by the actions of some) that may, in principle, be corrected by a correctly designed and implemented fiscal offset (tax). However, it is neither as clearly nor as
readily understood to be a correctable externality as, say, the effect of carbon emissions on global warming.

For useful overviews of some of the issues discussed at these meetings, which were widely covered in the financial press, see IMF (2010) and Munk (2013).

19

There are, of course, many excellent discussions of financial taxes that raise important issues other than those discussed here: see, for an interesting example,
Edgar (2013).
20

21
The effects of these levies are only beginning to be understood: see, for instance, a recent analysis of the German bank levy (Buch, Hilberg, and Tonzer 2014). For
an example of how complicated some of these taxes may be, take a look at the 252 page official manual issued at the time of the introduction of the UK bank levy
(available at http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/budget-updates/autumn-tax/bank-levy-manual.pdf).

For the most part governments have chosen not to pursue regulatory ends through taxation, whether with respect to taxing finance or carbon (as discussed
below). From a purely fiscal perspective, this may seem sensible: use taxes to collect revenue and regulations to regulate behavior. However, means and ends can
seldom be so neatly divided. Taxes may affect behavior in the same way as regulations and regulations may affect firms’ profits just as taxes (or subsidies) may do:
see the seminal study by Posner (1971) on “taxation as regulation” as well as such more recent studies as Otsuka and Braun (2002) and Avi-Yonah (2011). While it
is not always clear why the regulatory approach seems to be preferred the burgeoning new literature on political economy and behavioral economics is beginning
to close this important analytical gap (Congdon, Kling, and Mullainathan 2011). As yet, however, no one seems to have made much progress in applying these
emerging techniques to the world of international -- let alone global -- taxation, so little more is said here about such matters.
22
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Table 2

Table 2: Special Bank
OECD
Countries,
2013
SpecialTaxes
Bank Taxesin
in OECD
Countries,
2013.
Name of tax

Date
imposed
1998

Maximum
Rate 2013
0.0044706%a

Comments

Australia

Supervisory levy

Austria
Belgium

Stability levy
Subscription (unit)
tax

2011
1993

0.085%b
0.0965%

Stability levy

2012

0.035%

Annual tax on
savings deposits

2012

0.12%c

Finland

Bank tax

2013

0.125%

France

Bank levy

2011

0.5%

Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Korea
Netherlands

Bank levy
Bank levy
Surtax
Bank levy
Bank levy
Bank levy

2011
1975
2010
2011
2011
2012

0.06%d
0.6%e
0.053%f
0.04%
0.2%g
0.044%h

Portugal
Slovak
Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
United
Kingdom

Bank levy
Bank levy

2011
2012

0.05%i
0.4%j

A fee imposed by regulatory authority on the
asset value of entities regulated
On balance sheet of banks
On various bases for different classes of
institutions (e.g. certain reserves of insurance
companies)
On liabilities less equity and guaranteed
deposits
On qualifying deposits less interest attributed
in previous year times ratio of qualifying to
attributed interest
On combined risk‐adjusted assets. To end in
2015
On risk‐weighted bank assets for banks with
capital requirement over EUR 500 million
On liabilities with some exemptions
On value of loans made
On adjusted balance sheet total
On year‐end total liabilities
On foreign currency borrowings
On ‘unsecured’ debts (balance sheet equity
and liabilities less certain adjustments)
On total liabilities.
On liabilities.

Bank levy
Stability fee
Bank levy

2011
2009
2011

0.1%
0.036%
0.13%

On balance sheet. To end in 2015.
On liabilities
On global balance (with some exclusions)

Notes: (a) 0.00414% is the cost‐recovery rate on authorized deposit taking institutions, subject to a maximum of AUD2.1
million. In addition, a rate of 0.000566% is applied to all assets of such institutions. Certain other financial institutions are
subject to different rates. (b) Rate on EUR 1‐20 billion is 0.055%. An additional levy of .013% is imposed on the trading volume
of derivatives. (c) Rate varies from 0.03‐0.12% depending on ratio of loans granted to ‘real economy’ as opposed to other
financial institutions. (d) Progressive rates with maximum shown applying to base over EUR300 billion; additional tax of
0.0003% on derivatives held (on or off balance sheet). Maximum is lesser of 20% of (adjusted) annual profits or 50% of
(adjusted) annual profits of most recent 3 years, subject to further limitation that must pay at least 5% of calculated annual
contribution. (e) Rate on mortgage loans is only 0.12%. (f) 0.15% up to HUF 50 billion; banks can reduce liability by certain
factors. Rates differ for other financial institutions. (g) This is rate on liabilities with maturities of 1 year or less; rate for longer
maturities is lower. (h) This is rate on short term debt; 0.22% on long‐term debt Progressive rate by amount of levies in
preceding year. (i) Also a rate of 0.00015% on derivatives (with some exemptions). (j) Rate varies with amount of levies in
previous year and share of total assets of banking sector.
Source: Based on information in OECD (2013b).
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suggests that there is no rationale for such a tax if the
basic regulatory system is adjusted properly – which in
practice might mean imposing something like an FSC. On
the other hand, IMF (2010) noted that if inappropriate
regulatory policy created substantial rents (unearned
incomes) in the financial sector and a country decided
to subject such rents to special taxation, a FAT could not
only generate increased revenues efficiently but also
provide a uniquely efficient way to achieve the equitable
end of taxing overly generous reward structures.23
An appropriate FAT to achieve these ends might, for
example, be one that taxed profits on a cash flow basis
through any of the approaches often discussed with
respect to the reform of profits taxation – by allowing
both interest expense and a notional return on equity,
taxing only net distributions to shareholders, or defining
taxable receipts and expenditures to include principal
amounts (IMF 2010, Appendix 3). Somewhat similarly,
Vella (2012) argued that there was a stronger case for a
FAT than for an FTT on both equity and efficiency grounds.
In practice, however, although both the UK and France
introduced temporary bonus taxes at the time of the
crisis, countries have generally been hesitant to single out
employees in the financial sector in this way. Perhaps for
this reason the EU in 2013 followed the apparently more
politically palatable approach of adopting a regulation
that will, beginning in 2014, limit bonuses paid to highpaid bankers to the amount of their salary or double
that amount if approved by shareholders (PwC 2013).
Unsurprisingly, perhaps, by far the strongest opposition
to this approach came from the UK.24

Taxing Financial Transactions
Despite the popularity of bank taxes like those shown
in Table 2, in many ways the current favorite flavor of
financial taxation in public discussion is some form of
Financial Transaction Tax (FTT) -- a tax imposed not on
financial institutions as such but on specific types of
transactions. Such taxes may be levied on the sale of
specific financial assets, such as stock, bonds or futures
whether through organized exchanges or over-thecounter (OTC); they may be applied to currency exchange
transactions; or they may be general taxes imposed on
a variety of different transactions. Brondolo (2011) lists
23 different types of financial transactions that may

be subject to such taxes and, as Table 3 shows, many
of these possible tax bases seem to have been used to
varying extents by different countries. Other names for
similar taxes include Speculation Tax, Global Financial
Tax, Financial Tax, and Financial Instruments Tax.
The attraction of an FTT is obvious: not only are people
everywhere still smarting about the behavior of the
financial sector during the recent crisis but such taxes
have a potentially huge base and hence yield. However,
despite continuing concern about the dangers of
speculative bubbles, only a few countries have imposed
specific taxes on certain types of financial transactions
with the avowed aim of controlling short term speculative
actions. No global or regional FTT yet exists – although,
as discussed below, the EU (or at least part of it) is
scheduled to introduce such a tax in the near future.
As Table 3 shows, many countries have imposed a variety
of taxes on various categories of financial transactions in
part to help regulate and control the financial sector and
in part simply for revenue. Like the bank taxes listed in
Table 2, most of the taxes on financial transactions listed
in Table 3 are imposed on bases that are not uniform from
country and that over time have often – like the rates –
been changed, usually in response to countervailing forces
that Coelho (2009, 2) categorizes as “…the strong appeal
of…a good tax handle in times in public finance distress”
on one hand and, on the other hand, “…the controversial
nature of the tax, which finds hard to hold when the
strong need for additional tax revenue subsides.” Indeed,
some countries have a history of imposing, altering,
abolishing, and re-imposing such taxes. In addition to
the countries included in Table 3, for example, Denmark,
Ecuador, Singapore, Sweden, and probably others have
had some variety of FTT in the past – some on securities,
some on bank debits or transactions, some on currency
transactions and some on automated payment systems.
Some of these taxes, notably the UK stamp duty (and the
similar taxes in a number of countries heavily influenced
by British experience), are very old; others, notably
the post-crisis levies recently imposed in a number of
European countries (European Commission 2010; Credit
Suisse 2013) are very new. The simple attraction of a
large, expanding, and easily accessible tax base has even
led some recent authors to suggest that countries would
be well-advised to replace all or most of their existing tax
systems by such a tax.25 As Coelho (2009) notes, however,

23
The perceived need for either or both an FSC (for efficiency) and a FAT (for equity) would presumably be reduced by closer control of “unacceptably aggressive
tax planning” as proposed in IMF (2010, 10) and discussed at length in OECD (2013, 2013a) as well as by the reduction or removal of the strong tax bias favoring
debt financing suggested in Alworth and Arachi (2012), but such matters are beyond the scope of the present study.
24
The reasons for this opposition are discussed in detail in Seely (2013)’s interesting account of the lengthy UK discussion of both the bonus tax and the bank levy
(see Table 2).
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25
For such a proposal, see Cintra (2009). A very similar proposal has recently been put forward in India, in part as a way to reduce corruption: see ArthaKraniti
(2013).

Table 3: Financial Transaction
Taxes*
Table
3
Country

Year
Imposed

Rate
(Max)

European
Union
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium

2104
2001

Brazil

2011

Chile
China
Colombia
China
Cyprus
Finland
France
Greece
Guatemala
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Ireland

1974

Italy
Korea
Malta
Netherlands

2000
1997
2012
1998
2014
2004

2013

Financial Transaction Taxes*
Base

Comments

0.1%

Equities and bonds

0.1% on derivatives

0.6%
0.3%
0.15%
0.5%

All financial transactions
Certain financial instruments

Rates from 0.07%; capped (max 750 Euro)

1%

Tax on financial operations

Tax on foreign exchange derivatives abolished in
2013; short‐term overseas loans and credit card
transactions still taxed
Imposes 18% VAT on trade costs
Listed securities can only be traded on exchange

1.5%
0.8%
0.15%
1.6%
0.2%
0.6%
3%
0.1%
0.125%
0.14%
1%
0.2%
2%
6%

Financial transactions
Exchange‐trade instruments
Stocks, bonds
Securities
Transfers on stock exchange
Equities and similar
Stocks, bonds
Stocks, bonds
Equities, bonds, etc
Stock exchange
Stocks, bonds
Transfers on stocks
Equities; OTC transactions
Stock exchange
Transfers not on local stock
exchange
Purchase of large amount of
shares in real estate
company
Stocks, corporate bonds
Stocks, bonds
Securities
Equities; bonds, other
Secondary offerings
Stocks, corporate bonds
Equities and similar
Stamp transfer tax
Share transactions
OTC transactions
Securities transfers

0.15% on corporate bonds

Rates differ in different stock markets
Transfers not made on stock exchange

0.01% on derivatives
0.03% on bonds; 10% VAT on commissions
Stamp duty with rates varying up to 9% on transfers
for non‐real property
0.1% on equities
Stamp duty

Pakistan
0.15%
Peru
1989
0.08%
Plus 185 VAT on trade costs
Poland
1%
Portugal
2013
0.3%
0.3% on derivatives; 0.1% on high‐frequency trading
Russia
0.8%
Plus 20% VAT
South Korea
0.35
Spain
2014
Switzerland
0.3%
0.15% on Swiss securities
Taiwan
0.3%
0.1% on corporate bonds
Ukraine
2013
1.5%
Rates vary up for 0.1% on OTC tran
United
0.5%
Stamp duty
Kingdom
United States
SEC fee
Venezuela
0.5%
Stocks
Zimbabwe
0.45%
Stocks
VAT on trade costs
*Information in this table has been compiled from diverse sources that are not always in agreement and refer to different time
periods. VAT often applies to commissions and trade costs even when this is not specifically noted and may similarly apply to
such costs in countries not listed here. Moreover, countries often change the rates and coverage of these taxes. In short, the
table should be seen as only illustrative of the level and kinds of national FTT found in the world.
Sources: Credit Suisse (2013); European Commission (2010); Brondolo (2011); Beitler (2010); Coelho (2009)
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even in Brazil, where his analysis suggests the tax at one
time perhaps the most productive in Latin America, it
never yielded much more than 1.5 percent of GDP.26
Although much of the initial discussion of a financial
transactions tax envisaged a global (world-wide) levy,
the only real action beyond the country level has taken
place at the regional level in the European Union
(EU). The European Commission formally proposed
a plan to implement an EU-wide FTT in 2011 with the
principal objectives of ensuring that the financial sector
contributed in a “fair and substantial” way to covering
the costs of the crisis, discouraging financial institutions
from undertaking excessively risky (speculative) activities
and, of course, raising revenue. However, the unanimity
required to implement such a proposal at the EU level
could not be achieved in view of the opposition of such
countries as the United Kingdom and Sweden – both of
which, interestingly, had had experience with somewhat
similar taxes.27 In early 2012 the Commission proposed
that two-thirds of the revenue from the tax would go to
the EU budget, with the balance to the Member States.
Later that year, however, in reaction to resistance to its
earlier proposal the Commission suggested a so-called
‘enhanced cooperation procedure” that would allow
a minimum of nine EU members to go ahead with the
FTT without other member states being involved. After
11 (out of 27) member states decided to proceed, in
February 2013 the European Commission adopted a
proposal for an 11-nation FTT that would come into force
in 2014 if approved by all the participating member states
and the European Parliament (Siebert 2013).28 At the
time of writing, however, it appears that the eleven had
not yet been able to reach full agreement on such basic
matters as the scope of the tax and, not least, on how to
distribute the revenue, with some countries being very
reluctant to see any of the revenues flowing to Brussels.
As a result, it now appears that the EU FTT is likely to be
imposed much before 2015 (Fairless 2013).
The EU FTT proposal is for a small tax on the sale or
purchase of a wide range of financial instruments

when one of the parties to the transaction is a financial
institution and one (whether a financial institution or
not) is established in a participating Member State. The
purchase and sale of shares and bonds is to be taxed at a
minimum rate 0.1 percent and the exchange of derivatives
is to be taxed at 0.01 percent. These rates may seem low
but if a transaction from one investor to another goes
through a broker, a clearing house and another broker
ii would be taxed six times. Although over-the-counter
(OTC) trading is also taxable, it is obviously much more
difficult to enforce the tax on such transactions (Brondolo
2011) so some, perhaps considerable, divergence away
from organized exchanges to OTC trading may occur.
Even more questionable is the fact that the FTT is
supposed to be applied even to transactions outside of
the participating EU member states when one party is
taxable under the proposal as well as when the financial
instruments traded are issued in participating Member
States, although it is unclear how this provision could
be enforced in many cases. Its scope is bounded by the
exclusion from the FTT of transactions where there is no
link between the economic substance of the transaction
and the territory of a Member State. However, it is
expanded by the fact that the definition of a financial
institution may include certain non-financial institutions
and also non-EU financial institutions with branches in
Member States. On the other hand, the scope of the tax
is reduced by excluding several important categories such
as transactions on the primary market, spot currency
transactions, and the issuance of government bonds.
Although the original EU FTT proposal (as quoted by Vella
2012, 90) stated that “private households and SMEs not
actively investing in financial markets would hardly be
affected,” the implication that the incidence of the tax
will fall solely and completely on the parties who pay over
the tax to the government is unfounded. As IMF (2010)
correctly notes, it is naïve to assume that the tax will be
borne entirely by rich banks and bankers. Like all taxes on
transactions, much of the burden will probably be passed
on to users of financial services, both individuals and
businesses, and any businesses affected will in turn pass

26
European Commission (2010) provides a similarly restrained view of the likely revenue potential of an FTT as well as a useful review of the literature on the
incidence and effects of such taxes.
27
The UK tax is generally considered to work reasonably well. It takes the form of a small (0.5 percent) levy paid by purchasers of UK shares and assessed and
collected primarily through an electronic securities settlement system. However, registered market makers and large banks are exempted from this tax. In contrast,
a similar small tax imposed by Sweden in 1986 is usually considered to be a failure. Although initially the rate on share transactions was doubled and the base
was soon expanded to include all transactions in shares as well as bonds, the effect on trading volumes was dramatic: most bond trading soon vanished and
most (60 percent) of trading in Swedish shares moved abroad. All financial transactions taxes were abolished by Sweden in 1991. However, Sweden introduced a
new ‘stability fee’ at a rate of 0.036% on the liabilities of banks and other credit institutions in 2009. This levy is similar to the Bank levy imposed on bank balance
sheets in 2011 by the UK at a rate of 0.05% but as of 2013 levied at a rate of 0.13%: the rate was increased a number of times, largely to ensure that despite
reductions in the corporate tax rate, the taxes paid by banks would not be decreased (Seely 2013).
28
The 11 countries – all in the Eurozone – that have indicated they will sign on are Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Slovak
Republic, Slovenia, and Spain. Several other members of the Eurozone (e.g. Finland and Ireland) have at times indicated they too might sign on, but none of the
nine non-Euro EU countries seems to have publicly shown much interest in doing so.
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on their share also to consumers if they can. Moreover,
although the Commission justified the FTT both on the
grounds of fairness and the strengthening of the internal
market, it may well end up weakening that market in at
least some respects. As Siebert (2013) suggests, it is not
perhaps far-fetched to think that this proposal may have
been motivated as much or more by populist desires
to visit retribution on bankers in return for the pain
imposed by the financial crisis than by evidence-based
analysis that supported this particular way to adjust the
institutional structure of financial sector activity in the
EU.
In any case, the expected objections to such taxes
have been heard from the financial sector itself. As an
example, the Institute of International Finance (2013)
presents five arguments against the EU FTT. Three such
arguments apply to all such taxes, while the last two
relate to the limited geographic coverage of the EU FTT:
1. It will hurt savers and pensioners among others
because its ultimate burden will be borne by
end-users of financial services
2. It will reduce market liquidity resulting in higher
volatility, higher transactions costs, and a higher
cost of capital
3. It will be ineffective because over time the
system will work around it.
4. It will place affected institutions at a competitive
disadvantage and lead to loss of jobs in the
participating Member States
5. It will create serious extraterritorial concerns for
non-EU investors and reduce capital flows.
All of these arguments have been countered with varying
degrees of effectiveness by European Commission (2010)
as well as by many others such as Schulmeister (2012)
and Schaefer (2012). To take the first point, although it
was noted above that it was naïve to assume that the FTT
would stick where it hit, it is equally naïve to assume, as
such opponents of the tax as the Institute of International
Finance (2013) seem to do, that all or even most costs
will necessarily be passed through to end-users – let
alone to such politically resonant categories as savers
and pensioners. Does anyone really believe that there no
‘rents’ in the financial industry, as such statements seem
to assume? All that can really be said with certainty is
that no one knows how any FTT will be shared between
the owners and employees of financial institutions, their

immediate customers and others.
Similarly, arguments can easily be made – and supported
or refuted by selective recourse to the unsatisfactory
and uncertain evidence -- for and against the other
points in the above list. For example, while the second
claim is supported by some studies (e.g. Oliver Wyman
2012) it is countered by others, including the European
Commission’s own Impact Assessment accompanying
the original FTT proposal which noted, correctly, “…that
the effects of the FTT on volatility is largely inconclusive
and depends on market structure” (as quoted by Vella
2012, 94). Moreover, there is really not much to support
either side when it comes to deciding whether a financial
market with FTT will be less prone to crisis than one
without FTT. All in all, without going further into the
many complex details of what is a growing but still far
from definitive body of analysis, as Vella (2012, 90)
concludes, all too often both proponents and opponents
of the EU FTT seem to be making assertions “…with an
assuredness and lack of qualification that, at best, masks
the uncertainty which underlies them.”29
Finally, while, as mentioned earlier, not all details of
how the EU FTT will work are fully clear, and no doubt
many problems will be encountered in attempting
to implement this levy in a number of very different
countries, the extensive experience that these and other
countries have had with related taxes (Table 3) suggests
that to say that it will be ineffective and will result in
lost jobs and reduced capital flows overstates the case.
On the contrary, as both IMF (2010) and Brondolo
(2011) conclude, the existence of similar taxes in many
countries and the similarity of the international aspects
of the administrative problems involved to the problems
that already exist with other taxes suggest that, although
an FTT is indeed unlikely to work perfectly and may well
– like most taxes – give rise to some distortions, it can
in all likelihood be made to work satisfactorily without
bringing ruin to those countries that choose to impose it.

Tobin Tax
Although the FTT has sometimes been called a Tobin
Tax this term is more accurately used for a tax limited
only to international currency transactions (also
sometimes called a Currency Transaction Tax (CTT) or,
more colorfully, the Robin Hood Tax). Interestingly, while
this idea has been around for a long time, having been
initially proposed by a Nobel prize-winning economist
(Tobin 1974, 1978), major institutions and countries

29
There is of course a large literature on the FTT which is not reviewed here, ranging from such early overviews as Spahn (1995) and Shome and Stotsky (1995) to
more recent policy-oriented papers such as TUAC (2010) and Griffith-Jones and Persaud (2012) and more analytical papers like Bierbrauer (2012) and Fricke and
Lux (2013).
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have not so far demonstrated much interest in moving
in this direction. Somewhat provocatively, one reason
for this reluctance may be simply because the CTT has
been examined more carefully than most other global
taxes on finance that have been proposed recently. In
summing up a useful volume of diverse papers on the
Tobin tax, Eichengreen (1996, 285) concluded that,
before adopting such a tax, more definitive answers were
needed to “…questions about the operation of foreign
exchange markets: the scope for asset substitution, the
feasibility of market migration and the possibility that
foreign exchange transactions might be reorganized on
an over-the counter basis” as well as to “…questions
about the political economy of taxation: about the
economic as opposed to the statutory incidence of the
Tobin tax and about the political coalitions that are likely
to form in favour and in opposition.” As suggested above
with respect to the EU FTT, although considerable useful
research has been carried out on some of these matters
since this passage was written, our understanding of
both the economics and the political economy of such
proposals has not yet reached the point where such
taxes are likely to be easily accepted regionally, let alone
globally.
Nonetheless, taxes on international currency flows have
been long been taken seriously by economists and have
been the subject of considerable analytical work. Tobin’s
original proposal was aimed at reducing volatility in the
foreign exchange markets – an issue about which there
is still considerable discussion. As Rajan (2003) notes, for
example, a good case can be made for a small tax on such
transactions as part of the set of safeguards – prudential
regulations, liquidity enhancing measures, and restraints
on financial flows (including the Tobin tax) – intended to
prevent rather than resolve financial crises. Owing to
its likely effects on market expectations, the immediate
result of imposing such a tax once a crisis has occurred,
however, may perhaps exacerbate rather than improve
matters.30
Rajan (2003), like many who have written about the
Tobin tax, emphasized the desirability of imposing it
permanently on a global basis and using the revenue
redistributively as a supplement to aid.31 However,
his analysis did not presume either of these features

since in effect it considers the Tobin tax to be like any
other Pigouvian tax intended to correct undesirable
externalities. From this perspective, the government in
any country large enough for the expected benefits from
reducing the negative externality to offset any jobs lost in
the affected sector cannot lose from imposing such taxes
if they are properly designed and applied. If the tax base
is highly elastic, the undesired activity will be deterred to
some extent, which is, by definition, a desirable result.
If the tax base is less elastic, the deterrent effect of the
tax will be less but in compensation, it will generate
more revenue from a less distorting tax system, which
no government should really view as an undesirable
result. If a national Tobin tax were indeed such a win-win
levy, it is surprising that the United States and perhaps
the Eurozone countries have not already jumped on this
bandwagon.
In fact, as Stubbs (2012) discusses in detail, no country
has done do, although Brazil and Chile have arguably
at times come close.32 As Coelho (2009) notes, the few
national examples of the Tobin tax have generally been
established in response to a specific national economic
crisis and then removed when the crisis was past. The
electronic basis of the clearing and settlement system
currently operating in most countries with large currency
transfers suggests that the administration of such taxes
should be relatively simple (Taskforce 2010). However,
there seems to be no realistic prospect for global
currency transaction taxes (Stubbs 2012).The reason is
simple: there is insufficient agreement on the need for
such taxes, on the appropriate basis for such taxes, on
the structure of such taxes, on the use to made of any
revenues such taxes may generate or, most importantly,
on who would decide on all these matters and how.
Before the day of global taxation can begin to dawn these
fundamental problems need to be overcome.33
Consider, for example, the unusually well worked-out
proposal in Taskforce (2010) for a global tax on international
currency transactions. This report suggests that this CTT
– labelled, presumably for reasons of marketing, the
Global Solidarity Levy – should be administered by “…
an authority with formal oversight powers for licensed
international settlement infrastructure and executive
oversight of the proposed settlement institution’s tax

30
For a recent result suggesting that, on the contrary, the Tobin tax is effective in reducing exchange rate volatility even in turbulent periods, see Damette (2013),
which also provides a useful review of the conflicting theoretical and empirical literature on the effectiveness of this tax.

Essentially the same position was taken more recently by ECLAC (2011), with respect to both the FTT and the Tobin tax.
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The (recently largely abolished) Brazilian tax – the IOF -- is described in Coutinho (2012); for an analysis of the earlier Chilean experience, see Agosin and FfrenchDavis (1996).
32

Even if countries were convinced that they could impose such a tax with few undesirable consequences, it would of course require a very different political
decision for them to agree to devote any revenues thus gained to international development.
33
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raising functions in conformity with the legislation
in the jurisdiction of residence or operation of the
settlement institution (Taskforce, 2010, 28).”34 It then
goes on to propose (1) that the arrangements to create
such an authority should be worked out by an intergovernmental tax commission, to be chaired by the IMF
and convened by such worthies as the finance ministers
and central banks of the G20 and the countries that host
the larger international financial centres, the Board of
Directors of the Bank of International Settlements, and
representatives of the World Customs Organisation
Council, and (2) that the proceeds of the CTT to be imposed
on all international currency settlements should flow to
a Global Solidarity Fund which will disburse the funds
collected as determined by “…its own decision-making
board comprising a range of stakeholders including
civil society and business sector [from developed and
developing countries] together with the Consultative
Forum [which would include NGOs and other stakeholders
not on the board]” (Taskforce, 2010, 31). Unfortunately,
since no one has yet come up with any acceptable way
to establish any such global administrative entity - let
alone the World Tax Organization proposed by Tanzi
(1995)35 -- establishing an automatic way of channelling
increased resources to fund development seems still to
be a bridge too far down the road to global government
to be attainable in the near future.
As Morozov (2013) notes, those who oppose social
change invariably adopt one of three themes:36
•

Perversity – the proposed change will not
improve matters but worsen them

•

Futility – the proposed change will have no
effects in the long run

•

Jeopardy – the proposed change will threaten
some existing hard-won achievement.

Many of the arguments made in opposition to the FTT
can be categorized in these terms. Some have argued
that rather than reducing the volatility of financial
markets, the result may be to increase it, or that any
benefits obtained would be more than offset by the

administrative and compliance costs such levies will
impose. Others have said that it would either prove
impossible to administer such taxes or that over time
any initial effects would inevitably be cancelled out by
market adjustments. Still others have emphasized that
the tax will reduce investment and growth and hence
jobs or eliminate good jobs in the financial sector or
require giving up some sovereignty to unelected (and
presumably untrustworthy) foreigners.
On the other side of the debate, the recent discussion
about the bad behavior of the financial sector and the
perceived need to impose additional forms of regulation
and taxation on this sector (both to compensate the rest
of us for their past errors and to prevent them imposing
similar negative externalities in the future) implicitly
implies that Wall Street interests of the wealthy few have
dominated the Main Street concerns of the less wealthy
many. In reality, however, as Eichengreen (1996, 283)
noted, this dichotomy does not describe present reality.
Most of us now live on Wall Street in the sense that we
are all engaged to some extent, whether we are aware
of it or not, in an international market: most businesses
are, directly or indirectly, affected by what happens in
interdependent international financial markets as are
all households with pensions or other assets (including
housing). It follows that measures affecting those markets
are in all likelihood going to flow through and affect all
of us, and not always in obvious ways. For example,
although the final incidence of global taxes – in other
words, whose real income is affected -- is seldom if ever
confined solely to those who pay the money over to the
taxman, even if much of the tax ended up taxing savers
and investors it would still be progressive (Michalos
1997). Nonetheless, even in democracies dominated by
the middle class (that is, those who have some assets) a
critical mass of voters may be unhappy with this result.
Perhaps if such taxes were to be coupled with higher
taxes on the rich (and perhaps also more support for the
marginal middle class) and hence reduced inequality,
especially in terms of opportunity, they may become
accepted (Bird and Zolt 2013) but these deep and dark
waters cannot be further explored here.

34
The settlement institution envisaged in Taskforce (2010) is based on the Continuous Linked Settlement Bank, a privately organized network of banks providing an
institutional framework for trading in most world currencies.
35
The related remark by another international expert that “…the idea of an autonomous international tax institution has, perhaps, arrived” (Shome, 1995, 25) has,
it seems, turned out to be rather optimistic.

He attributes this useful categorization to Hirschman (1991).
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Global Environmental Taxes
Well before the recent concern about the potentially
undesirable effects of cross-border currency flows and
financial speculation other forms of global taxation
had been suggested as possible ways to achieve two
apparently contradictory ends -- discouraging activities
which demonstrably (or at least arguably) harmed others
than those who decided to carry out such activities and
at the same time producing additional revenue. The idea
of using taxes to offset the mispricing (or divergence
between private and social costs) that may induce
private decision-makers to take actions that impose costs
(negative externalities) on others has of course long been
familiar in the form of so-called Pigouvian taxes (after
Pigou 1920). Only in recent decades, however, has this
concept received much emphasis in the global context,
particularly with respect to the issue of financing global
public goods.37 Four examples of such taxes are taxes on
the arms trade, taxes on tobacco, taxes on international
transportation, and, most importantly, taxes on carbon
emissions more generally. By far the most important of
these is the last, which – together with the related issue
of taxing international transport -- is discussed in this
section. The other possible “externality” taxes mentioned
are discussed more briefly in the next section.

Taxing International Transportation
Global tax proposals relating to aviation and shipping
have largely been made in the context of discouraging
carbon emissions. Perhaps partly for this reason,
such proposals have often ignored the existence of a
myriad of existing international agreements that shape
the present national tax systems on such traffic and
distribute revenues between countries (Keen, Parry
and Strand 2013). For example, Oxfam (2011) proposed
a tax of $25 per metric ton (tonne) of carbon emission
as a way of taxing the estimated 3 percent of carbon
emissions coming from international shipping. As is not
uncommon in this literature, the proposal focuses less on
the technical and institutional way in which such a levy
might be implemented or on its effects and more on the
more politically attractive question of how to allocate
its proceeds. Forty percent of the revenue was to go to
developing countries to offset increased shipping costs
with at least a similar share going to a Green Climate
Fund which would also be directed to developing

countries to help them adapt to climate change and
control their emissions. The balance was to be spent on
developing cleaner shipping. Allocating funds in such
ways is presumably intended to muster political support
for the proposal.
However, since the real benefits from taxing negative
externalities are associated with the tax rather than
the expenditure, more attention should be paid to
the fact that agreement on the need for international
cooperation is required from developed and developing
countries as well as the industry if such taxes are to
be successfully implemented (Keen, Parry and Strand
2013). Much the same may be said with respect to
taxing international air travel. As in the case of shipping
-- and indeed with respect to reducing carbon emissions
in general – a sensible way to launch any reform in this
area would seem to be to focus first on the substantial
extent to which the carbon-emitting activities associated
with international transport are now in effect subsidized
through under-taxation, in part owing to deliberate
national policy decisions and in part as a the result of the
network of international agreements on the taxation of
such activities that have evolved over the years.38
The idea of imposing global taxes on international
air travel as a means of financing development was
suggested at least 50 years ago (Seers 1964). Unlike
most such proposals, however, this idea became a reality
at least to a limited extent when nine countries (France
and a number of developing countries) imposed a small
tax on air passenger tickets – the so-called solidarity
contribution -- in 2009, with the proceeds going to
UNITAID.39 The tax varies in different countries but in
2013 in France it was imposed at the rate of I euro for a
domestic economy seat, 10 euros for a higher-class seat,
6 euros for an international economy seat and 40 euros
for a higher-class international seat.
UN (2012) suggests that one reason this small levy
appears to have been accepted by the public is because
it is earmarked for a popular cause. This hypothesis
appears to be untested. An interesting recent study by
Kaufman, McGuirk, and Vicente (2012) suggests that,
even though survey evidence indicates that people in
most countries believe their country spends much more
on foreign aid than it actually does, it also shows that

See the references cited in note 7 above.
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38
For more on the subsidy issue, see the discussion of fossil fuel subsidies below as well as the discussion of the specific arrangements in international
transportation in Keen, Parry and Strand (2013).

Arguments supporting such a tax may be found, for example, in WHO (2009). On UNITAID, see note 8 above.
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they would nonetheless like to see even higher levels of
aid than those they perceive.40 Two notable exceptions
to this conclusion are the US and Japan, where perceived
aid levels exceed desired aid levels. Even in these
countries, however, the data suggest that most people
would still apparently support increasing aid above its
current level.41 Counterbalancing the apparently high
degree of support for increased foreign aid in some
EU countries, an early EU working paper on the tax on
air tickets concluded the amount likely to be collected
from a voluntary surcharge on such tickets might not
be sufficient even to pay for the cost of administering
the system (Commission 2005). When the EU included
international air flights in its more general Emissions
Trading System (see below) in January 2012 for flights to
and from European airports, in effect it introduced such
a carbon tax (though one that produced no revenue).
Subsequently, however, the EU first suspended the tax
for flights to and from non-member states and then, in
October 2013, revised the tax so that it applies only to
the portion of such flights occurring within EU territory
(and with flights to and from many developing countries
being exempted).

Taxing Carbon Emissions42
Fifty years ago high school students were, at least in
Canada, told more about the prospect of a ‘little ice
age’ than about the dangers of global warming. Times
have changed. One of the most striking results of the
substantial scientific work on climate change that has
been carried out in recent years has been to reinforce the
case that not only is something is going on with respect to
global warming but that we should do something about
it. Even Canadians, who react like others to pictures of
lonely polar bear cubs floating on an ice floe in their
rapidly receding frozen north, are becoming worried. In
1997, after lengthy discussion and negotiation, the first
binding international agreement on climate change, the

Kyoto Protocol, to which most countries in the world
were parties, came into effect in 2005.43 The United States
neither signed nor ratified the Protocol (and Canada,
which had done both, formally withdrew in 2012). In
contrast, the EU not only signed and ratified the Protocol
but introduced an Emissions Trading Scheme as its major
instrument for emissions reduction. A recent review of
several dozen studies of the effectiveness of this scheme
in reducing carbon emissions and its possible effects on
growth and employment concludes that, on the whole,
the results of such studies may best be summed up as
“not conclusive” (Martin, Muuls and Wagner 2012).
Nordhaus (2011) goes further and argues that not only
has the Kyoto Protocol failed to produce any noticeable
reduction in global emissions but that its “inefficient
and opaque” approach to the problem does not provide
a sound basis for dealing with the problem of climate
change arising from carbon emissions. This conclusion is
not surprising. As Norhaus (2011, 10) says, “…thousands
of governments, millions of firms, billions of people, all
making trillions of decisions each year – need to face
realistic prices for the use of carbon if their decisions
about consumption, investment, and innovation are to
be appropriate.” To bring such results about is not easy
in a world in which obligations can be imposed on a
sovereign state only with its consent. The bottom line
is that everyone – or at least most -- may perhaps be
able to agree at some point that we should do a better
job in controlling carbon emissions. But it is difficult to
measure the relevant costs and benefits of doing so given
the complexity (and time dimension) of the problem and
there are major distributional concerns with respect
to both costs and benefits. Uncertainty combined with
conflicting interests is a recipe for delay and inaction, as
the climate debate has amply demonstrated.
The world has, over the centuries, managed to develop
various instruments and institutions that with varying

40
Economists are sometimes a bit skeptical of results based on even the best-constructed survey data. Hirschman and Bird (1968) suggested years ago that one
way to test the extent to which taxpayers were really willing to support foreign aid might be by permitting them to earmark a small fraction of their income taxes
for this purpose, but no one appears to have done so. Even in the (unusually and consistently generous) Nordic countries the linkage between how much (and
what kind of) aid the public would support if they had the choice and what is actually done by their governments seems rather tenuous (Selbervik and Nygaard
2006).
41
Kaufman, McGuirk, and Vicente (2012) suggest that one way to reduce what they label the ‘democratic deficit’ between the aid people seem to want to support
and the amount of actual aid might be for governments to ‘match’ charitable expenditure abroad in the same way as they match (usually through the tax system)
charitable donations domestically. This is already done to a limited extent in some countries; in Canada, for example, foreign donations are given the same tax
treatment as domestic donations when given to a charity to which the government has itself given funds.
42
Many government policies affect the ‘price’ of carbon emissions such as energy efficiency standards, fuel taxes, and support for renewable energy. However, only
emissions trading schemes, carbon taxes, and the removal of fossil fuel subsidies are considered here. Other greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions such as nitrous oxide
are not discussed.
43
The Kyoto Protocol committed countries to meet international binding targets for reducing GHG emissions, with heavier burdens being placed on developed
countries as being primarily responsible for the increased GHG found in the atmosphere: see http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php. For a useful
overview of the lack of effective enforcement under this agreement, see Gillenwater (2013). As usual with such international agreements, the targets set are
mandatory only to the extent that countries voluntarily live up to them.
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Table 4

Table 4: Carbon Taxes
and
Trading
Carbon Taxes
and Emission
Emission Trading Regimes
(ETR) Regimes (ETR)
Jurisdiction

Year
Introduced

Rate
US
$/tonnea

Baseb

EU

2005

Canada:
Quebec

2007

$9.89

Canada: BC
US: California

2008
2012

$39
$14

Fossil fuels

Denmark

1992

$26

Finland
Ireland
Netherlands
Norway

1990
2010
1990
1991

$39‐$78
$26

Slovenia
Sweden
Switzerland
UK

1997
1991
2008
2001

$20
$163
$19
$7

Fuels other than
petroleum
Fossil fuels
Fossil fuels
Fossil fuels
Mineral oil,
gasoline and
natural gas

Australia

2012

$24

China

2013

India
Japan

2010
2012

$4‐$71

CO2 and two
other gas
emissions

Estimated
Coverage of
Emissions
45%
30%

45%

10%
60%

Coal
Fossil fuels

ETR
ETR Auction reserve price, to
increase by 5% plus inflation
annually
Offset by lower CIT, PIT
ETR Auction reserve price, to
increase by 5% plus inflation
annually
To increase annually by 1.8%
until 2015
Rate depends on fuel type
Rate depends on fuel type and
usage

35‐60%
$3

Comments

20%

Fixed rate
Fixed rate
Carbon price floor; scheduled
to increase to 2020
ETR Fixed price, to increase by
2.5% plus inflation
Pilot ETR in 2 provinces and 5
cities

ETR in 3 cities. Price scheduled
to increase gradually over next
few years
Kazakhstan
2013
50%
ETR
Korea
2015
60%
ETR
New Zealand 2008
$0.85
50%
ETR Fixed price ceiling
South Africa
2015
$14
Substantial exemptions for
most firms. To be increased by
10% a year until 2020
Notes: This table combines incomplete and not always compatible information from several different sources for
illustrative purposes only. (a) 2013 prices per metric ton of CO2. (b) Base is usually carbon content of fuels unless
otherwise indicated. All countries also apply other taxes on motor fuels and most exempt certain uses.
Sources: World Bank (2013); OECD (2013c); Vivid Economics (2012); various news sources on specific countries.
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degrees of success attempt to deal with such problems.
Good arguments that are persuasive to most economists
(Nordhaus 2011) can be made in favor of carbon taxes
instead of the type of quantity regulation embodied in
the Kyoto Protocol. Since, as mentioned earlier, it is the
tax and not how it is spent that is important, the simplest
approach would seem to be to let countries collect any
agreed uniform carbon tax and spend it as they wish.
Unfortunately, it is not easy to determine how to develop
and implement the conceptually ideal system of a uniform
tax on carbon emissions from every source everywhere in
the world. Even in the EU, where concerns about global
warming have had most effect on policy, most such
policies have tended to take the form of quantitative
controls, regulation, and subsidization of supposedly
more carbon-efficient alternatives such as renewable
energy sources (wind, solar) rather than tackling the deep
public reluctance (and industry resistance) with respect
to the outright imposition of carbon taxes. No one really
knows how best to achieve the best policy outcomes
through the regulatory approach and, as experience in
many fields suggests, as a rule that it is not all that difficult
to manipulate regulations (and regulators) to generate
rents for some while failing to produce the apparently
clear and precise outcomes they seem to offer.
A carbon tax – a simple levy of a fixed amount per unit
of carbon emissions - is preferable to the more complex
approach of an emissions trading scheme, which places
a limit on total emissions and allows permits, up to that
cap, to be traded in order to establish a uniform price
for the ‘right’ to produce carbon emissions. The tax
approach has several advantages. Taxes yield revenues,
whereas most existing emission trading schemes, such
as that for carbon emissions in the EU, basically give the
right to emit pollutants away to existing producers, thus
dissipating any potential revenue. To avoid this outcome,
some jurisdictions (e.g. California) have auctioned
off allowances rather than dispensing them for free.
However, the second advantage of a tax – that it is fixed
– cannot be so easily attained with an emission trading
scheme even when allowances are auctioned because
the price of emissions will vary, thus creating potentially
distortionary effects on investment and production
decisions. To deal with this problem, additional provisions
are needed to stabilize emission prices, essentially by
government setting floor and ceiling prices and selling

additional allowances when prices near the ceiling and
buying them when they near the floor. As Keohane (2009)
and others have argued, in principle with careful design
and management one can craft an emissions trading
scheme that would achieve the same results as a simple
uniform carbon tax. In practice, however, as the existing
array of ETRs set out in Table 4 suggests, no one has come
close to doing so.44 Finally, taxes are simpler to administer
than ETRs and do not require the creation of a new
regulatory authority. In short, though far from simple,
carbon taxes are easier to design, simpler to administer,
and more likely to be effective than equivalent regulatory
approaches. Nonetheless, as Table 4 shows, although a
number of early adopters like the Nordic countries did
impose such taxes on fossil fuels, most recent adopters
have instead favored various versions of ETR whether
at the subnational, national, regional, or -- as the Kyoto
Protocol shows -- global level.
The reasons why most countries prefer the more complex
(and uncertain) ETR approach over carbon taxation are
primarily political. That a carbon tax produces revenue
may be seen to be a problem rather than an advantage for
two distinct reasons. First, some may object to additional
taxes of any sort, and such protests will undoubtedly be
heard even if the revenues from the carbon tax are used
to replace other, more obviously distorting taxes, such
as corporate income taxes. There are always both losers
and gainers with any tax change. Because losers are
seldom happy to lose while gainers are often unaware
that they have gained, the political calculus inevitably
favors losers. Secondly, if the revenues are indeed
additional – and perhaps even if they are not – there are
always arguments about whether other taxes should be
lowered or if expenditures should be increased and, if
so, which expenditures. Some will argue for more to the
poor, others for compensatory expenditures to regions,
industries or groups that may lose from the imposition
of the tax, and still others for earmarking revenues to
activities seen to serve the same goal of environmental
improvement such as expanding solar and wind power
generation.45 In contrast, an emissions trading scheme
may appear to be a winner from a political perspective
(perhaps especially if it inefficiently allocates existing
producers tradable emissions rights for free) since
governments can then claim to be doing ‘something’
without appearing to hurt anyone.46

For descriptions of existing market-based mechanisms for reducing carbon emissions in the form of both emission trading regimes and taxes, see OECD (2013c)
and World Bank (2013).
44

45
The same phenomenon may emerge with an emission trading scheme if firms are permitted to satisfy their quota by spending on such emission-reducing
activities instead of reducing emissions directly. In practice, it appears to have been difficult to measure and verify such offsets (Keen, Parry and Strand 2013).
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46
A more comprehensive model of the political distortions that may arise from both the regulatory and the taxation approach to dealing with externalities by
Masciandaro and Passarelli (2012) shows that both approaches are all too likely to end up being distorting. Determining which is more likely to be better given the
national, let alone international, political setting requires knowing a number of things that we are, alas, unlikely to know. Life is difficult to model.

The long-standing debate about carbon taxation received
new impetus recently when the IMF (2013) issued a
report (responding to earlier G-20 communiques in 2009
and 2012) concluding that not only are additional taxes
on carbon emissions needed but that it is also essential
in pricing properly the economic damage created by
carbon pollution to eliminate the subsidies for fossil fuel
use that exist in many countries. Like all proposals for
carbon taxes, the IMF report was immediately criticized
– for one example, see Lewis (2013) -- for many reasons,
some plausible (such as the uncertainty of many of
the estimated parameters) but many seemingly based
on little more than simple assertions about the evil of
the (presumed) international control of the revenue or
about how badly it would be used even if spent by the
governments that collected it. However, almost none
of these criticisms weaken the strong case made in IMF
(2013) for reducing subsidies to fossil fuels.

Reducing Fossil Fuel Subsidies
Indeed, subsidies to the production and consumption
of fossil fuels in many countries are so inefficient and
inequitable and the budgetary impact of eliminating
them so obvious (IMF 2013) that it is surprising that so
much effort has been spent on reaching an international
agreement on carbon emissions control through
regulation and taxation when it may appear to be so
much easier just to revise bad subsidy policy.47 Of course,
even if all subsidies are abolished a strong case could still
be made for additional carbon taxation (IMF 2013), but it
appears to be at least as hard to take away a subsidy as
it is to impose a new tax. A country – indeed the world
– may well lose in environmental as well as budgetary
terms from subsidizing fossil fuels and, as McLure (2013)
shows, the benefits of such subsidies may flow mainly to
those with higher incomes (and hence more ways to use
cheap fuel). Nonetheless, it is always and everywhere
difficult to take a fiscal benefit away from anyone
without giving them something roughly equally valuable
in return.48
Subsidies provide jobs for some (e.g. coal miners), direct
benefits for others (e.g. vehicle owners), and to some

extent indirect benefits to everyone (e.g. through lower
transport costs). The sum total of these benefits may
be less than the costs imposed on the country (not to
mention on the world as a whole) by the combination of
the less efficient use of scarce investible resources and
the external costs of increased pollution arising from the
subsidy. However, such costs are – apart from such highly
visible instances as a bad air day in Beijing – difficult to
understand compared to the headlines generated by the
direct and visible losses to some that result from reducing
fuel subsidies. Many governments require the support
of those who lose from altering subsidies, and it is not
surprising that attempts to reduce subsidies have often
aroused strong and sometimes violent public opposition
(e.g. from taxi drivers and farmers) with the result that
governments wishing to stay in power have soon backed
down and restored the subsidies.
Nonetheless, fossil fuel subsidies are almost always a bad
idea, for many reasons:49
•

They discourage investment in the energy
sector50

•

They may crowd out growth-enhancing public
spending (e.g. on education)

•

They diminish the long-term competitiveness of
the private sector

•

They create incentives for smuggling

•

They make it more difficult to deal with the
volatility of international energy prices

•

They complicate budgetary management

•

They create substantial negative externalities
(ranging from global warming to such more local
concerns as pollution, excessive vehicle traffic,
and overuse of irrigation pumps) and hence
environmental and health costs51

•

They increase global energy demand and prices

•

They often – indeed, in all likelihood, almost
always -- are inequitable and mainly benefit
higher-income groups.

47
As McLure (2013) documents, fossil fuel subsidies use up over 10 percent of budgetary revenues in at least 21 poor countries, including such giants as India,
Indonesia, Pakistan and Egypt as well as such other countries as Thailand, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Malaysia and most oil-producing countries. He reports that, for the
37 countries for which the International Energy Agency (IEA) had complete data for 2011, the average fossil fuel subsidy rate was 24 percent, with 54 percent of
the total subsidy going to the consumption of oil products, 20 percent to natural gas, and the balance mainly to electricity generated by fossil fuels.
48
For further development (in a different context) of the concept that an implicit ‘fiscal contract’ underlies politically sustainable fiscal policy in most countries, see
Bird and Zolt (2013).

This list is based largely on IMF (2013).

49

Incidentally, subsidies to forms of energy production that are less obviously polluting – biomass, wind, solar – are themselves often distorting and may have
undesired effects.
50
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51
As Zivin and Naedel (2013) document, there is increasing evidence that the negative impact of worsening environmental conditions on growth and well-being is
even stronger than previously thought.

These are strong arguments. There is a good case in both
environmental and fiscal terms for reducing fossil fuel
subsidies in many countries (McLure 2013), although
doing so may, like any changes in energy prices, raise
complex political and technical issues.

of an equally visible and dramatic crisis on the world
level, it may be a long time – perhaps too long – before
enough leaders in enough countries are willing to act in
a sufficiently coordinated and cohesive way to deal with
carbon emissions.

Summing Up

The path to success in this field, as with respect to all
global public goods, is thus unlikely to be either straightforward or quick. The answer, if any, as just mentioned
may emerge from some cataclysmic event that leads to
immediate universal agreement. Alternatively, it may
emerge from a set of complex, partial, and lengthy
decisions in response to various specific issues as yet
another example of the ‘punctuated equilibrium’ that
seems often to describe the evolution of institutions as
well as species (Mahoney 2012). As with trade in the
decades after World War Two -- and to a lesser extent
with taxes over the century since World War One (as
discussed below) -- the world may continue, no doubt
painfully, imperfectly, and gradually to work out ways to
deal with international environmental issues until enough
decision-makers in enough countries decide that they
have to do something about the problem. In the end,
although the Kyoto Protocol was arguably premature
and flawed in some respects, it may perhaps be seen as
one of the first steps on the long and crooked path to
working out how to reconcile national sovereignty with
appropriate global adaptation to climate change.

By far the most important form of global tax intended
to counter negative externalities is a tax levied on the
carbon content of fossil fuel -- in effect, a form of carbon
pricing that would act like an environmental fee on the
production, distribution or use of fossil fuels such as oil,
coal and natural gas. The amount of the tax depends on
how much carbon dioxide each type of fuel emits when
it is used to run factories or power plants, provide heat
and electricity to homes and businesses, drive vehicles
and so on.52 Many varieties of taxes have been discussed
under this general heading – Climate Change Levy, Fuel
Tax, Motor Fuel Tax, Coal Tax, Car Taxes. Importantly,
unlike many of the proposed ‘global’ taxes discussed in
this paper, various forms of carbon taxes have actually
been introduced in a number of countries in recent years,
as shown in Table 4, in addition to the substantial taxes
imposed for more purely fiscal reasons on motor fuels in
almost all countries.53
Of course, there remain serious political problems in
working out how to deal with such global problems owing
in large part to the differing inter- and intra-country
distributional impacts of corrective policies. When so
many countries, from the richest to the poorest, have
been unable to move very far in this direction even when
there is strong evidence (as in the case of reducing fossil
fuel subsidies) of the direct benefits to them from doing
so, the prospects for sensible global policy on carbon
emissions remain remote. It took the great smog of 1952
in London, which killed at least 4000 and left at least
100,000 people ill, for England to adopt the Clean Air Act
of 1956, which ended the choking yellow smog that had
for decades blanketed its capital city.54 Something similar
may be happening in China now, where the recently
launched effort to reduce air pollution has no doubt
been stimulated at least in part by the fact that, as in the
case of London, national leaders, like other inhabitants
of the capital, are enjoying the benefits of bad air.55 Short

The case for a global approach to carbon emissions is
probably stronger and more important than the case for
any other global tax. In some ways, however, the friends
of such ideas have at times been as unhelpful as such
obvious enemies as those who would directly lose as a
result of proposed changes. Demanding that perfect
policies be immediately adopted in a world in which
history shows that progress towards almost any goal is
as a rule accomplished only incrementally is to ask for
disappointment. Purists -- who to most people seem
all too willing to sacrifice the immediate well-being of
others for the possible long-term betterment of future
generations -- are unlikely to win the day unless and
until the accumulated (and visible) evidence that change
is needed is clear to all. For example, to say that even
such a (large) incremental change as reducing fossil fuel
subsidies is insufficient and inadequate compared to the

52
While all quantitative estimates in this field are subject to qualification and often highly sensitive to assumptions about discount rates and other factors, the most
recent official estimate of this cost in the US (for 2010) was $35 per ton of CO2 (IWAG 2013), a figure that is higher than most existing carbon taxes (see Table
4). However, even in the data-rich environment of the United States, it can at times be surprisingly difficult to determine the precise allocative and distributional
effects of changes in energy prices (Davis 2014).

As Miller and Vela (2013) show, taxes on motor fuel significantly reduce pollution.
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The figures cited come from an official source (http://www.metoffice.gov.uk/education/teens/case-studies/great-smog); other sources give higher estimates.
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See http://www.scmp.com/news/china-insider/article/1341969/severe-air-pollution-spikes-beijing,
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immediate and full-hearted adoption of a global ETR is
like saying that taking two steps in the right direction
is useless unless one gets to the goal immediately. At
best, such comments may remind us that there is still a
long way to go; at worst, however, they may discourage
us from even attempting to move in the right direction,
not least when added to the chorus of negative voices
inevitably raised by those whose direct interests are
affected by such changes. As Harrison (2013) suggests
in an interesting analysis of the British Columbia
experience with carbon taxation, for instance, it seems
often to take a chain of coincidences – a surge in public
concern about climate change, a government with the
trust of the business community, the availability of lesspolluting sources of energy, and committed leadership
– for a carbon tax to be adopted, and even more for it
to be sustained. But it can be done, although it is most
unlikely to be done immediately, easily, or evenly around
the world.
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The case for a carbon tax does not rest on any specific
use being designated for the revenues. However, the
political acceptability of any such levy may in practice
depend on if and how the funds are earmarked, for
example, to finance ‘clean’ technology or to compensate
low-income households for increased costs owing to such
taxes. Countries should be left to direct the revenues
they collect as they see fit. Taxes collected or spent by an
international agency seem far less likely to be acceptable
than taxes imposed and spent nationally. How to
achieve coordination of a global scale with such taxes is
a sufficiently difficult issue. To attempt at the same time
to take the further leap of redirecting the funds to other
countries makes the task far more difficult.

Other Global Tax Proposals
Taxing the Arms Trade

Taxing Tobacco

An interesting global tax that has been suggested at least
in part as a way of moving the world closer to peace is
a Tax on the International Arms Trade (sometimes called
a Weapons Tax or a Gun Tax) to be imposed on arms
sales and possibly individual gun purchases. However,
this tax appears to be not only one of the least well
developed proposals but also one of the least likely to be
implemented. Apparently first suggested by Mahbub ul
Haq (1976) and since revived at various times by the then
Presidents of France and Brazil as well as others (Brzoska
2004) neither the case for such a tax nor how it might be
implemented has ever been well developed.56

The control of communicable diseases (e.g. malaria,
SARS) is an example of a global public good. Interestingly,
however, the most prominent health-related global
tax proposal relates to smoking, which certainly has
undesirable health effects but is hardly a communicable
disease requiring a global Pigouvian tax in order to
control it.58 Nonetheless, a Global Cigarette (Tobacco)
Tax, an additional special tax on tobacco -- ideally
with its proceeds being earmarked to funding health
programs -- has been strongly urged by the World Health
Organisation (WHO 2012).59 Health experts have of
course long emphasized the desirable health effects of
higher taxes on tobacco (Jha and Pelo 2014), and most
countries already impose substantial tobacco taxes.
WHO (2012) notes that the design and administration
of many such taxes could be substantially improved,
for example, by monitoring and increasing tax rates as
necessary to maintain the effective rate in the face of
inflation and growth and by taxing all tobacco products
in a comparable way and at similar levels. Commendable
as the aims of those advocating higher tobacco taxes
may be, however, although increasing tobacco taxation
in many countries may often make sense in terms of
improving public health outcomes, there seems neither a
clear case for or a real need for any kind of global tobacco
tax.60

Despite the obvious difficulty of taxing illegal trade, a
tax on the international arms trade is simply another tax
on international trade, and should be technically easier
to implement than taxes on either finance or carbon.
Curiously, however, most proponents of such taxes
appear to ignore the tricky question of tax incidence and
to assume that they would be paid by arms exporters
in rich countries rather than by the people of poor
importing countries, as Brzoska (2004) correctly argues is
much more likely. Apart from such intellectual confusion,
one reason why such ideas have had so little traction may
perhaps be, as many have argued for years, that those
who gain most directly from wars, civil and international
– the international arms traders themselves – simply have
too much political influence.57 Another reason, however,
may be simply because almost everyone, perhaps even
those who make proposals for taxes to control the arms
trade, thinks that -- like the famous $200 tax on machine
guns introduced by the U.S. National Firearms Act in
1934 (which still exists in law, at the same rate) – such
proposals are better understood in symbolic terms than
in terms of their expected impact in practice.

Taxing Wealth
Other global tax proposals that have surfaced at various
times, with different objectives, include proposals to
tax the rich, to tax natural resources, and to tax the
digital economy. For example, a Global Wealth Tax has
sometimes been discussed to tax the rich, usually with
the idea of channelling the revenue to the poor in some
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Interestingly, although a UN-sponsored international arms trade treaty (available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2013/04/20130410%2012-01%20PM/
Ch_XXVI_08.pdf )was accepted by the United Nations in 2013 and has already been signed by over 100 countries, including the United States (although not yet
ratified by the Senate), the issue of imposing special taxes on such trade was little discussed and plays no role in the treaty.
57
For an early example of this argument, see Engelbracht and Hanighen (1934); for a recent update, see http://www.globalissues.org/issue/73/arms-trade-a-majorcause-of-suffering
58
The UNITAID tax on air travel discussed earlier does of course finance work on such diseases. However, the tax as such, although arguably contributing in a minor
way to one global public good (reducing carbon emissions) has no meaningful connection with reducing communicable disease.
59
Health care in general and health expenditures related to smoking in particular may need additional funding but the case for earmarking the proceeds from
taxes on smoking to funding these activities is not very strong (as argued in e.g. ITIC 2013). Although this point is not further discussed here, see also Bird and Jun
(2007).
60
An important exception, stressed for example, in Allan (2012) is that tax levels may need to be kept close to those in neighboring countries owing to the relative
ease of smuggling cigarettes. Canada learned this lesson some years ago when some provinces raised their cigarette taxes for health reasons well above levels in
the neighboring United States but soon reduced them again to control smuggling, in part because the obvious alternative of increasing border controls worked
directly against the intent and reality of NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) and in part because of the serious political problems of dealing with
smuggling on the First Nations (Indian) lands located on the border (Kelton 2008).
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way. Such a levy might be based on the aggregate
value of all household assets, including owner-occupied
housing; cash, bank deposits, money funds, and savings
in insurance and pension plans; investment in real
estate and unincorporated businesses; corporate stock,
financial securities, and personal trusts. Another version
is the so-called Billionaires Tax, consisting of a tax of (say)
1 per cent on individual wealth holdings of $1 billion or
more. National wealth taxes, usually imposed at a low
flat rate, already exist in a number of countries and have
recently been receiving some support from economic
studies, although the latter tend to favor taxes on wealth
transfers.61 In practice neither type of wealth tax has been
all that popular anywhere in recent decades, although
even some conservatives are apparently beginning to
rethink the issue in light of the recent marked increase
in the wealth of the very wealthiest (McKinnon 2012).62
Taxing Resources
Taxing natural resources has long been a favorite target of
those concerned with the apparent basic inequity of the
distribution of the wealth generated by such resources
between those who, in the terminology often used,
own them and those who exploit them. For example, a
Global Resources Dividend (GRD) has been suggested in
the form of a tax on the extraction of natural resources,
with the revenue being used for poverty relief (Pogge
2008).63 For the last 50 years or so, special attention has
been paid to the exploitation of what is often called the
‘global commons’, that is, territory not within national
boundaries such as Antarctica, outer space, and, most
extensively, the oceans. To consider only the last of these,
in the 1980s 162 countries ratified a UN convention on
the Law of the Sea though others, including the United
States, objected to provisions relating to undersea
mining. As noted earlier, UN (2012) recently restated
the case for an agreed global arrangement with respect
to potential undersea wealth, recommending a Global
Undersea Resource Royalty in the form of a royalty on
all undersea mineral resources extraction more than
100 miles offshore of any nation’s territory. UN (2012)
also mentions possible international taxes or fees on
renewable resources such as certain types of forestry
exploitation.

As with tobacco, all countries already tax natural
resources in some fashion, with such taxes being
particularly important in a number of developing
countries. Considerable attention has been paid in
recent years to increasing the transparency of both
national and international fiscal arrangements with
respect to extractive industries in particular: for example,
25 developing countries are classified as compliant with
the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI)
with another 16, including the UK and the US, listed
as candidate countries.64 Many of the world’s largest
oil and mining companies are also listed as supporters
(stakeholders) of EITI, which reports data on payments to
governments from companies based on separate reports
from companies and governments as reconciled by an
independent auditing firm (selected by the country).
Although clearly much could be done to improve the
effectiveness and impact of this pioneering effort (Anayati
2012), efforts to extend such work more broadly in terms
of coverage of both companies and countries may in the
absence of any real system of global governance perhaps
turn out to be a more effective way to improve the global
taxation of this sector – and perhaps eventually of other
sectors also – than further attempts to introduce more
explicitly global taxes on natural resources.
Finally, a quite different type of resource tax proposal
may perhaps still be worth mentioning. Some years ago,
there was considerable discussion of an international
Brain Drain Tax to compensate poor countries for the
loss represented by the movement of educated people
to rich countries. Proposals along this line were put
forward by Bhagwati and Dellafar (1973) and were
subsequently discussed in detail by various authors
(e.g. Bhagwati and Wilson 1989). Although international
migration (legal and illegal) of skilled and unskilled labor
remains important, little has been heard recently of the
interesting theoretical and practical issue of how best to
tax migrants.65 One reason for this neglect may be in part
because the earlier discussion was almost completely
focused on the personal income tax – a tax that, at least
until very recently, has been much less central to public
policy discussion in most countries than had earlier been
the case (Bird and Zolt 2005).

61
For a useful compilation of wealth data for different countries, see Davies (2008); for interesting recent reviews of the case for increased taxation of wealth and
especially transfers of wealth, see Institute for Fiscal Studies (2010, 2011).
62
As one might expect, McKinnon’s opinion piece, when published in the Wall Street Journal, immediately called forth a cascade of (mostly opposing) opinions in
both the press and the ‘blogosphere.’ Few of those commenting seemed aware of the extensive documentation of the extent to which the slower growth of the
last few decades has accentuated wealth concentration and inequality: see, for example, Alveredo et al (2013) and Piketty (2014).
63
For interesting discussion of this proposal by philosophers, see the subsequent contributions by Casal (2011), Steiner (2011) and Pogge (2011). As with any good
philosophical discussion, the debate has not yet ended.

See the official web page at http://eiti.org/.
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Although see the interesting suggestion in Wilson (2008).
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Taxing Cyberspace
Some years ago Cordell and Ide (1997) issued a clarion
call to impose a special tax on the use of ‘cyberspace,’
which they called the ‘new wealth of nations.’ Perhaps
in part because the contemporaneous view of many that
the digital era had ushered in a completely new economy
– a belief that justified the marketing of all too many
over-hyped new high tech companies -- soon proved
to be false the response to this call was disappointing.
Recently, however, despite the sobering experiences of
recent years, this idea has been reborn. For example,
WHO (2009) suggested a Global Internet Tax as a way
of taxing the new digital economy and others have at
times suggested similar taxes with various names and
suggested bases – taxes on internet access (levied on ISPs,
or internet service providers), on email sent or received),
on bandwidth (speed of internet connection), on ‘bits’
(internet usage by volume), on text (or SMS) messages,
and, more prosaically, on utilities and cable operators.66
Other than perhaps reflecting the understandable
annoyance of busy people at unwanted interruptions
the primary rationale for most of these suggestions was
probably simply that the increasing size of the potential
tax base offers an opportunity to generate substantial
revenue with low tax rates. Most of the serious opposition
to such taxation -- excluding the sort of general ranting
that unfortunately is all too common on internet forums
– seems to have emphasized the undesirable deterrent
effect such taxes would presumably have on the spread
of innovative methods of communication.

Unfortunately, few who propose such innovative
tax solutions for the problems of the world seem to
understand much about how the present tax system works
or why it works that way. Looking at old problems with
fresh eyes may sometimes provide a useful perspective.
Indeed, a fresh view from outside the fiscal community
may not only provide an inspiring vision of the ‘city on
the hill’ to which all good pilgrims should aspire but may
also suggest potential solutions to current fiscal problems
that have been missed by those locked in the trench
warfare of fiscal life. However, reformers who speak
from passion and idealism rather than from experience
and realism seldom seem to understand either the
real nature of the policies they are advocating or how
those policies may interact with or be accommodated
by the existing international fiscal structure. Much of the
discussion of taxing the internet – both pro and con -- has,
for example, has paid little or no attention to the current,
long-established international arrangements with respect
to telecommunications systems that carry all this digital
traffic. Indeed, when the question of revising the ITU fee
structure (discussed earlier) came up recently, most of
the rather vociferous opposition uncovered by a Google
search seems to rest on the notion that the abstraction
called the ‘internet’67 should continue to be free – as,
curiously, many of those involved seemed to think that
it actually was – with little or no attention to how such
freedom related to the existing (or potentially attainable)
international tax regime.68

66
Many of these suggestions, with sources, are mentioned in McCullagh and Downes (2012). Interestingly, and perhaps surprisingly, a text tax was actually
suggested at one point by the Managing Director of the IMF.
67
For an illuminating discussion of the many misconceptions underlying the common usage of this term as if it had a clear and unarguable meaning, see Morozov
(2013).
68
In contrast, tax experts have produced a substantial literature on the potential erosion of the tax base with the rise of the digital economy. Much of this literature
is focused on the different treatment of internet sales from ‘brick-and-mortar’ sales under state retail sales taxes in the United States (Fox (2012) provides a useful
starting point), but there is also a large literature on the international ramifications of digital commerce for a range of taxes: an early but still useful overview may
be found in Doernberg et al. (2001).
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Fiscal Justice and Earmarking
As noted earlier, many proposals for global taxes have
as their aim the goal of providing a more automatic
and reliable source of financing for the development of
poorer countries. Such proposals date back at least to a
proposal for a small tax on selected luxury goods such as
TVs and dishwashers (UN 1970) and have been the focus
of many studies of innovative ways to fund development
finance over the years. Politicians and philosophers have
put forth a wide variety of other ideas for global taxation,
ranging from a 2003 proposal by the then President
of Brazil for a tax on arms sales as way of financing a
program to end international hunger (Brozka 2004) to a
more recent proposal by an academic scholar for a global
tax on resources (Pogge 2008).
No such idea has as yet produced any significant results,
however, and none is likely to do so. A principal reason
for this pessimistic conclusion is that most such proposals
have two characteristics in common. First, their prime
motivation is redistributional: they are explicitly intended
to redistribute resources to poor countries. Secondly, the
proceeds of the taxes proposed are usually intended to
be administered by some international agency rather
than by the governments of the countries from which the
revenues are collected. Each of these characteristics is
worth discussing briefly.
“Tax justice” has, for example, been called “the lifeblood
of functioning democracies” and said to lie “at the heart
of the social contract between citizens and the state”
(Christian Aid 2013). Viable and sustainable democracies
do indeed depend to an important extent for their
sustenance on what is in effect a fiscal contract between
citizens and state and there is good reason to think that a
tax system seen as fair constitutes an important element
of such a contract.69 However, extending this argument
to the world as a whole assumes that the world can be
treated as though it is a meaningful political unit -- if
not a unitary state, at least a federal state. However, in
reality the world is not a state in any sense. Moreover,
deplorable as it may be, the evidence suggests that most
who live in rich countries do not care as much for those
who are so unfortunate as to fall outside their national
group as they care (reluctantly or otherwise) for those
with whom they share citizenship (or residence).70

People everywhere identify more with those they know
than with those they do not, and injustice within one’s
accepted (or legal) group is taken far more seriously as a
political matter than injustice between one’s group and
those outside one’s group. Foreign aid thus is, and always
has been, a fringe budgetary outlay in most developed
countries, and most countries have proved reluctant to
hand over more than a fraction of even this small amount
to multilateral administration. People may of course
be moved by appeals to their better nature, especially
when the evidence of crisis is placed before their eyes.
But there is little evidence that any significant number
of citizens in the developed world are willing to increase
their tax burdens in order to fund international income
transfers to even the most worthy candidates, let alone
to hand over such funds to some international agency
that decides who gets how much.71 In short, as Christian
Aid (2013) and other agencies advocating such views
usually, if reluctantly, recognize, there is regrettably
little likelihood that the serious imbalances in access
to resources found in the world today will be quickly
rectified without major and improbable changes in power
relationships both between rich and poor countries and,
often, within individual countries.
Attempts to remedy this situation by increasing the
transparency and openness of fiscal arrangements
(such as the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
mentioned earlier) are a small but desirable step towards
this goal. Much the same can be said of efforts to develop
workable and perhaps eventually persuasive ways of
using taxes (among other instruments) in ways that may,
as Pogge (2011, 352) argues “…slow depletion of natural
resources and the deterioration of our environment
while also greatly reducing the huge unjust burdens
now imposed on the world’s poor.” More information
and better understanding may, over time, lead to more
recognition of the connections between these matters
and hence to attitudinal changes and eventually even to
political responses that may begin to move both national
and international systems towards a better world for
all. Of course, even without such action, as economists
have long argued, and as experience seems clearly to
have confirmed in recent years, more generalized and
sustained economic growth will continue to reduce world
poverty and perhaps, over time, also world inequality.

See e.g. Bird and Zolt (2013) and references cited there.
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This assertion may perhaps be acceptable in the present context but of course, like some of the other complex issues touched on in this paper, it is not easily
documented and has long been discussed, from different perspectives by philosophers (Wellman 2000; Coons 2001), psychologists (Ashmore, Jussim and Wilder
2001), and economists and political scientists (Gradstein and Konrad 2006; United Nations 2006) among others.
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But see note 40 above and accompanying text.
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Incremental improvements in achieving such goals
are thus possible on a number of fronts. However,
emphasizing the redistributive aspects of global tax
proposals is unlikely to be a major selling point to the
people and politicians of rich countries. Those who
wish to change the world would find it more productive
to emphasize proposals that provide not just real gains
for the less fortunate but some visible gain for almost
everyone. For instance, increases in taxes on carbon
emissions may perhaps at some point come to be seen
as sufficiently beneficial in the eyes of enough groups
to overcome the often more immediately politically
attractive options of regulation and subsidy -- not to
mention the even more popular option of doing nothing.
Countries, rich and poor, may come to see the benefits
of taxing bads of all sorts (pollution, congestion, healthdamaging consumption) rather than, as some now do,
subsidizing them. At times it may even make sense to
tie such levies to certain expenditures: for example,
properly charging for transport may be feasible only
if those who pay can see some direct and visible
compensation, for instance in reduced congestion. Until
countries can resolve such relatively simple questions
sensibly within their own borders, however, regional or
global initiatives to redistribute funds in a major way
from rich to poor countries, let alone to extend taxing
authority, to an international body are unlikely to be
successful. On the whole, as Kaul and Le Goulven (2003)
conclude, disentangling the issue of aid finance from
that of financing global public goods would improve both
debates.
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One reason countries find it hard to impose good taxes
on bad activities is because such activities sometimes
support good jobs in poor places. Like trade protection,
subsidies to presumably ‘good’ activities (e.g. renewable
energy) are frequently justified in part on similar grounds
and in part on ‘infant industry’ grounds. Over two
centuries of economic arguments do not seem to have
weakened the political attractiveness of such measures.
Those who can tell a good story by generalizing a
particular (and perhaps atypical) example that seems
to support their case seem able to carry more weight in
debate than 100 solid econometric studies that support
the opposite case. Much of the debate on global taxes
has been fought along these lines, with proponents of
such taxes postulating a utopian world in which we care
as much about poor peasants in some far away country
as we do about jobs and income in our own community,
while opponents postulate an equally unreal world in
which every dollar shifted away from some existing
activity not only reduces our income and jobs but is also
wasted by a rapacious, corrupt and wasteful international
bureaucracy. The intellectual debate may, at times,
seem to be won by those who emphasize altruism and
internationalism; so far, however, the practical politics
of taxation remain firmly dominated by self-interest and
nationalism.

The Reality of International Taxation
Most proposals for global taxes on activities such as
resource extraction, international transport, and digital
transactions, as well as such presumed ‘bads’ as tobacco,
the arms trade, luxury consumption, and even billionaires
have several features in common: they have not been
fully thought through, they are likely to prove difficult
to administer effectively, it is not clear that their effects
would be as beneficial as their proponents usually argue,
and, perhaps most important, it seems unlikely that most
of them will ever be imposed. These are serious defects.
However, they do not mean that discussing global
taxation is a waste of time and effort. Indeed, without
utopian thinking about what a better world might look
like and how we might get there, and without efforts by
some to persuade the rest of us of the importance of
such matters, humanity would perhaps have never left
the caves and we would find it even more difficult to sort
out how to cope with the difficulties and problems that
those who live on this planet currently face. However, as
successful revolutionaries soon learn, the thinking, skills
and efforts needed to overthrow the old regime are not
those needed to establish a sustainable – let alone better
– new world.
Sandler (2001, 107) suggested over a decade ago that
“the design of supranational structures is about to enter
a new era in which nations may be prepared, for a few
specific activities, to sacrifice some autonomy.” Although
carefully hedged, this conclusion now seems to have
been too optimistic. Indeed, some now think, as The
Economist recently put it, that “the forward march of
globalisation has paused since the financial crisis, giving
way to a more conditional, interventionist and nationalist
model” (Ip, 2013, 3) and that “the fate of globalisation
rests on whether America, China and the rest of the world
see open borders as being in their national interest” (Ip
2013, 19). But even this considerably restrained view
may perhaps be too optimistic. There is nothing new
about the recent pause in the march to globalization.
The extent to which sovereign states agree to give up
any degree of sovereignty remains, as it has always
been, limited, dependent upon what those who control
political decisions think is in it for them, and conditional
on their continuing to perceive that they gain from the
deal. As American history from the League of Nations
(an American initiative that in the end was not accepted
by the United States) to the Kyoto accord (which the
United States first agreed with and then failed to affirm)
suggests, the strengthening of democracy in significant

For example, the present author made such a proposal in Bird and Brean (1986).
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parts of the world in the last few decades may in some
ways make it even more difficult to make such deals. The
interests of the many (or at least the interests of many
influential groups) and not just those of the ruler (and
close associates) must now be taken into account.
A closer look at how over the years countries have
managed to smooth at least some potential conflicts in
the fiscal area may offer some lessons with respect to the
prospects for global taxation. For example, one proposal
that has been urged by some as the way to resolve the
current problems with taxing international income is
to adopt what is often called unitary taxation (Picciotto
2013). This term is shorthand for a system of world-wide
reporting of corporate income with profits apportioned
to different jurisdictions in which corporations are active
in accordance with an agreed formula. Over the years,
experts have often suggested that the unitary approach
is a more sensible approach on both conceptual and
practical grounds to the reality of firms that operate
across national borders than the current system of
separate entity accounting, under which a branch or
subsidiary within the jurisdiction is accounted for as a
separate entity.72
Under the current approach transfer prices must be
estimated for transactions with other parts of the
corporation or group, with the objective being to produce
a result as close as possible to that which would emerge
if all such prices were set at arm’s length by unrelated
companies. In practice, however, such estimates are
generally complicated, uncertain, and often somewhat
arbitrary. The outcome of the exercise may bear as little
relation to reality as does the underlying assumption
that the parties on both sides of such transactions are
independent entities rather than components of the
same company. In contrast, formulary apportionment
– the approach used to allocate profits to subnational
jurisdictions within federal countries like the US and
Canada – is simpler in both concept and practice,
attributing profits (or losses) to each jurisdiction based
on such more observable and measurable factors as the
proportion of sales, assets or payroll in that jurisdiction.
There are clearly good arguments in principle for this
approach (Picciotto 2013). However, the lengthy history
of international taxation suggests that such a radical
change in the system is less likely than continuation of the
traditional process of marginal adjustments by specific
countries attempting to cope with specific problems in
specific ways.

The rationale for the current approach to taxing crossborder transactions rests on a stylized set of facts: (i) small
and evenly-balanced flows of cross border investments;
(ii) relatively small numbers of companies engaged in
international operations; (iii) heavy reliance on fixed
assets for production; (iv) relatively small amounts of
cross-border portfolio investments by individuals; and
(v) only minor concerns with international mobility of tax
bases and international tax evasion. These assumptions
do not reflect current reality. Many business operations
have changed drastically as production has become
more dispersed, with different (though integrated)
operations taking place – in reality or at least in terms
of fiscally relevant paper -- in different countries. The
share of total value-added – the ultimate tax base -arising from services and intangibles has increased to the
point that it is difficult to locate the source of corporate
income or taxable activities sufficiently clearly in space
(or time) for any country to be able to tax that income
with a demonstrably superior relative claim than other
countries involved.73
The commonly accepted arm’s length standard for
measuring and allocating the international income
of business enterprises among taxing jurisdictions is
intended to provide a basis for national taxation of the
“correct” share of such income. As noted above, however,
to do so this approach applies traditional conventions
based on separate entity accounting to multinational
and global corporations that consolidate commercial
activities organized and operated along functional lines
according to centers of business interest. Assuming
that such economic units can meaningfully be divided
into legally separate components for tax, management
accounting or other purposes flies in the face of reality.
Multinational enterprises exist precisely to avoid the
costs and limitations of dealings between unrelated
parties. The economic rent such firms obtain by operating
as a single economic entity that avoids these costs and
limitations cannot be properly captured and allocated by
the prevalent tax approach. National tax administrations
need effective institutional ways to tax such enterprises,
but characterizing them in a manner that directly
contradicts their essence and manner of operation does

not provide a promising path to sustainable tax policy.
Indeed, the effort to make this approach workable may
result in its becoming so reliant on a series of fictional
assumptions – conceived initially as practical expedients
to adjust for possible profit distortions attributable to
common control -- that over time the inherent weakness
of this approach is magnified and compounded to the
point that it becomes unworkable.74
One path to global taxation might perhaps be to establish
as clearly as possible the Wicksellian connection
between taxes and expenditures so that those who pay,
those who benefit and those who decide are essentially
in agreement.75 But there is no effective political unit
within which such ‘fiscal contracts’ between countries
and interests can be negotiated. One cannot have either
global taxes or an effective, coherent and coordinated
international tax regime without ‘global governance’ -and, as yet, the latter is much more a dream (or, for some,
perhaps a nightmare) than a reality. In the absence of any
effective world governance framework a more workable
approach may perhaps be to establish small taxes with
relatively modest goals which can be piggybacked as much
as possible on existing fiscal and political institutions and
implemented through a relatively ‘soft’ regime resting
largely on explicit and implicit agreements between
states.76 Whatever approach is taken, those interested
in developing better ways of financing the achievement
of particular global goods, like those concerned with
reforming the existing international tax system, should
perhaps focus more on issues of ‘process’ (how things
get done) than ‘substance’ (what gets done). Both are
important; but if something does not get done it matters
little how sound it may be in principle since it will not
exist.
In a globalizing world, countries face a difficult dilemma
with respect to politics and economics: there is no simple
way to have both autonomous nation-states and full
global integration. The power to tax is a key attribute
of the modern nation state and no state will readily
forgo that power. The present international tax regime
is the outcome of many previous attempts to reconcile
increasing globalization and national sovereignty. As
experience over the last century clearly demonstrates,

This paragraph, like much of the remainder of this section, is based in part on Bird and Wilkie (2013).
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For example, the well-known OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines (OECD 2010) started out as a way to provide valuation guidance in identifying when and to what
extent there were distortions in the distribution of profit within a group attributable to the possibilities for manipulation engendered by common control. It is far
from clear that the application of these guidelines as transactional accounting standards is or ever can be adequately matched by the legal concepts and tax law
provisions needed to give them life.
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For an elaboration of this approach at the sub-national level, see Bird and Slack (2013).
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This concept comes close to Krasner’s classic definition of an international regime (1982, 186) as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” For an excellent review of the global governance literature as it
applies to international tax issues, see Eccleston (2012).
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countries are more willing to forgo full integration than
to give up state power. Much of the discussion of global
taxation does not face up adequately to this central
problem in a world in which there is no world government
with the moral, political or economic basis for imposing
taxes. An efficient global Tobin tax, for example, may well
be technically possible (Taskforce 2013). But it is likely to
be politically feasible only if countries are guaranteed that
those who are taxed have full control over the amount
of revenues collected and how it is spent-- that is, if the
system is run by real (imperfect) national tax regimes and
not by some mythical (perfect) supranational entity.
Another approach is to focus on the practical regulatory
dimension of the emerging new world economic and tax
policy order. The seeds of such an international approach
to tax regulation may be found in various more or less
formal interactions of tax policy and regulatory authorities
such as the OECD’s Global Tax Forum and others.77
Countries have increasingly been sharing financial and
tax information through a plethora of Tax Information
Exchange Agreements (TIEAs) in addition to information
exchange arrangements contained in bilateral tax treaties.
In principle such agreements are intended to limit the
possibility that income can be hidden from interested
tax authorities although success in this respect remains
elusive.78 One way or another, both tax administrators
and tax policy makers are becoming increasingly well
informed about and influenced by developments and
approaches in other countries.
No country is going to abandon tax claims in favor of the
interests of another country when it comes to taxpayers
with observable connections to both unless there is a
significant reason to do so in its own interests. Countries
act, at best, in the interests of the ‘national welfare’ of
their citizens, not some abstract conception of ‘world
welfare’; at worst, they may act mainly in the interests
of those with substantial economic or political influence.
Whatever the motivation, it is this axis of interest –
countries acting as if they were economic actors in
relation to each other through their respective taxpayers
– that underlies the internationalization of tax policy and
rules and has given rise to the complex administrative
web of tax treaties, information sharing, transfer pricing
agreements among taxpayers and tax administrations,
and the like. Looking at the way in which international

taxation currently works, it is difficult to discern that
anyone involved has been thinking very clearly about
the objective of international tax policy. Provisions such
as those on controlled foreign corporations and foreign
tax credits found in national tax laws, like the many tax
treaties that now exist, are at best pragmatic attempts
to accommodate the many physical and legal ways in
which commercial activities actually take place by adding
on particular features to tax laws developed essentially
for domestic purposes, with little attention being paid
to how such new international features interact with
domestic tax policy objectives let alone achieve any more
global objective.
Nonetheless, although no one can be quite sure what
is going on and why, for many years taxpayers and their
various governments have one way and another, through
language and through commercial relations, been
communicating with each other to the point that, at
least in conceptual terms, it is perhaps not unreasonable
to argue that a sort of loose confederation of a number
of more developed national tax systems has emerged.
This construct is in some ways not all that different in
some respects from the more formal arrangements
that exist within federal countries to co-ordinate the
contemporaneous application of national and subnational
taxes on similar income and consumption bases. One
reading of the extensive literature on taxation in federal
states, like the broader literature on decentralization in
general, is that what may at first seem to be the costly
duplication of functions and unnecessary costs of
coordination inherent in a decentralized decision system
compared to a single monopoly decision-maker may
in reality both provide useful redundancy in a complex
system coping with constantly changing conditions and
an increased possibility that innovative solutions may
emerge as a result of involving different decision centers.
Similar arguments may perhaps hold in the even more
heterogeneous and changeable international setting. Of
course, a quite different interpretation is also possible:
current international tax rules and practices may be
interpreted not as the outcome (given coordination costs
and conflicting objectives) of a rational process but as
little more than a last ditch rationalization for clinging to
outmoded practices and constraints. Time will tell which
characterization is closer to reality.

77
A recent overview of many of the issues discussed here may be found in OECD (2013). Relevant groups include the Forum of Tax Administrators (FTA), a panel of
national tax administrators established in 2002 by the OECD’s Committee on Fiscal Affairs to promote dialogue between administrations; the Leeds Castle Group,
a group of tax administrators from a number of major countries, including some non-OECD countries like China and India, who meet regularly to discuss mutual
compliance problems; and the Joint International Tax Shelter Center established by the U.S., U.K., Canada and Australia to develop and share information on
abusive tax avoidance.

For an optimistic view of the prospects for future international tax information exchange and cooperation, see Grinberg (2013). For considerably more restrained
appraisals of these prospects, from two very different perspectives, see Shaviro (2014) and Eccleston (2012).
78

32

Taking the more positive perspective, however, there
appears to be increasing realization that competing tax
systems are moving in this direction, as evidenced by
heightened awareness and responsiveness in each country
to the economic and tax policy characteristics of other
tax systems. One outcome may be that such theoretical
concepts as inter-nation equity (fair international sharing
arrangements) may over time become more important.79
At present, however, as Lang and Owens (2013) note, the
international tax regime falls far short of satisfying any
conceivable distributional goal. Tax treaties, for example,
are mainly geared to the interests of richer (residence)
countries, and some observers such as Thuronyi (2010)
have suggested that most developing countries might be
better off not signing such treaties, essentially because
the degree of ‘reciprocity’ (reciprocal gain) critical for
attaining a mutually beneficial outcome is unlikely to be
present. Indeed, even within residence countries treaties
inevitably reflect the fundamental tension between
their two conflicting objectives: to raise more revenues
from residents while at the same time attracting more
investment from abroad. Both within and between
countries, it seems, more explicit and transparent
discussion and, one must hope, agreement as to who
should tax what and how much is needed, if countries
are to be able to tax international transactions to any
significant extent.
Current efforts (OECD 2013a) to establish a more leakproof international tax regime may end unhappily
unless both the political foundations of the regime are
strengthened and the critical issue of administrability
is resolved. Even the best-designed international tax
regime will not work if it cannot be reliably collected -for instance, because some key parameters are porous or
indefinite, or because it is simply too complex to expect
adequate compliance even from diligent and honest self-

For a useful recent discussion of inter-nation equity, see Brooks (2009).
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enforcers or adequate enforcement from even the best
tax officials. Such problems are unlikely to be resolved
quickly or easily by the widespread adoption of a radical
policy change like the unitary approach. Instead, the
path to workable solutions is more likely to lie in the kind
of continuing evolutionary and accretionary process of
change – ‘punctuated equilibrium’ (Mahoney 2012) –
that marks the past history of international taxation.
One way or another, no relatively open economy can
now think of what tax regime is best for it in isolation
from the taxes that exist in other countries. The current
international tax and trade regime is the result of decades
of effort to reduce both the distortionary effects of
multiple trade taxes and the use of taxes to shape, color
and subsidize trade and, to some extent, investment.
The questions debated by League of Nations experts in
the 1920s, like the language of that debate, are eerily
similar to present debates at various international and
cross-national levels about how to grapple with the even
more difficult (and considerably broader) problems that
arise from the increasingly large share of income coming
from such ‘footloose’ factors as intangibles and financial
structuring. Tax systems have always competed with each
other for shares of a shared tax base. Historically, when
countries’ interests collide, solutions have been reached
either through conflict or, in one form or another,
through cooperation. Few issues are more important
in determining tax policy today than deciding how to
cope with the international environment. The extent to
which and the manner in which the issues currently at
the forefront of international tax discussions are resolved
will have important implications – for better or for worse
-- for the future prospects of global taxation and, indeed,
for the critical question of global governance in general
(Eccleston 2012).

The Way Forward
It is not hard to think of potentially large global tax bases
on which even a low tax rate might potentially yield a
lot of money. But this does not mean that such taxes
are necessarily acceptable, feasible, or desirable at the
global level. Until nation-states in the interest of their
own survival and (one hopes) the continued well-being of
their citizens are willing to forgo substantial sovereignty
in favor of an effective world governance structure,
matters are unlikely to change much. It may be fun to
think of global tax proposals; it may be possible to make
impressive calculations of their revenue potential; it may
even, as mentioned earlier, be a good idea to discuss and
explore such proposals because important global public
goods like stability and even survival may in the end only
be achievable as and when countries begin to act as well
as think globally. Those who put forth such proposals
have usually done so with the best intentions and for
reasons that are worth taking seriously. However, not
only is the way forward unlikely to be quick or simple but
the path to progress is much more likely to be through the
further evolution of the sort of ‘soft’ international context
in which international tax matters are now discussed
than by creating any kind of effective supranational tax
authority.
When solutions to problems are hard to find, sometimes
the best way to react may be to approach them differently.
Taxes, like the world itself, are never perfect and always
in need of constant revision and interpretation. Even the
most technically perfect legal designs or technological
solutions (e.g. to increase tax transparency or to foster
international tax cooperation) cannot and will not
ever achieve perfection let along stasis in a changing
environment. The best and most sustainable approach
to both international and global tax problems lies less
in cleverly innovative tax design than in developing and
improving the process through which such problems are
(and will almost certainly continue to be) defined and
resolved.
One essential condition for a sustainable solution is
greater inclusivity: more of those affected in a significant
way by decisions must be heard -- and know that they
are heard -- in reaching those decisions. Even the best,
most prolonged and thorough consultation process may
never reconcile some to accepting decisions to which
they object. But when such decisions are reached as
part of an on-going reciprocal process, with some losing
on this and others on that front, they are more likely to
be acceptable even to those who lose than are decisions
Eccleston (2012) discusses this earlier experience in detail.
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that losers can rationalize as having been imposed from
above or outside.
A major failing of the current international tax system
has been the (generally correct) extent to which it
has been seen to reflect primarily the interests of the
major developed countries. Many of the proposals for
global taxation discussed earlier have suffered from the
reverse problem: too often they appear to represent
only the interests of the poorer emerging countries to
the detriment of the interests of those who are (or think
they are) expected to bear most of the burden. Despite
the limitations of the OECD-type soft law consensus
approach to at least partial and acceptable solutions to
complex international issues through a lengthy and ongoing process of technical work and policy discussions
involving an increasingly large and more representative
group of countries and interests, gradually extending
this process and making it more inclusive remains the
most promising way available to develop common goals,
definitions, concepts, assessments and evaluations of
the very broad ranges of activities and interests affected
by tax decisions.
Global issues of justice and fairness need not be dealt with
globally and cannot be dealt with solely by nation-states:
what is needed is some forum between these extremes in
which such issues can be discussed and, perhaps, resolved
(Sen 1999). Because the traditional closed economy
analytical box no longer adequately encompasses the
critical marginal (international) component of tax policy,
national policy choices increasingly have to be framed
outside that box. Relatively open developed countries
have already begun in effect to delegate more and more
elements of national tax authority to such informal
arenas as associations of tax administrators and policy
makers concerned with international tax issues.
However, those charged with shaping and implementing
national tax policy must also continue to work towards
more transparent and balanced processes in shaping the
international tax policy decisions that impact on and to
some extent limit national tax policy autonomy. The ongoing policy discussions reflected in OECD (2013, 2013a)
seem unlikely to produce results that are in any sense
definitive or likely to be acceptable to all, or for that matter
to be quickly implemented. Indeed, if pushed too far and
too fast, the outcome of the current process may prove
to be as unsuccessful as was the earlier attempt to attack
‘harmful tax competition.’80 Even if the process eventually

led to the establishment of some kind of nascent ‘world’
tax organization, it is inconceivable that it would have
even the small degree of independent taxing power of the
European Union.81 Moreover, although strong leadership
by strong states like the US will remain an essential
element in resolving international (let alone global) tax
issues it may no longer be enough. An increasing number
of other countries must also sign on if such initiatives are
to succeed. Indeed, if one extrapolates the experience
of the EU to the world at large one possible inference is
that traditional leaders in international tax matters like
the US may over time perhaps become a bit less likely
(and able) to take actions on their own to avoid or reduce
their own perceived problems, especially when such
actions may arguably pre-empt more broadly acceptable
(less US-focused) solutions that may perhaps, over time
have emerged from the kind of increasingly formal joint
policy actions and administrative cooperation between
national administrations that is already taking place.82

81
A recent study suggests that “…the concept of a fiscal union will only work if political integration goes significantly beyond the current state of affairs, and
probably far beyond levels that would be supported by European citizens and voters” (Fuest and Peichl 2012, 9). If this can be said about the European Union after
a half-century of economic union, the prospects for meaningful fiscal union at the world level seem bleak indeed.

See, for example, the contrasting views in the sources cited in note 78 above.
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Conclusion
Three major issues arise with respect to global taxes:
Are there circumstances in which such taxes are not only
desirable but necessary? Is an explicitly redistributive
global tax system a reasonable goal? Are there instances
in which ‘global’ taxes may be not only sensible but
feasible? The answer to the first of these questions at
present appears on the whole to be negative. The day may
come when climate-induced starvation and migration,
mass deaths from pollution, the world-wide collapse of
the financial system, or some other catastrophe such as
widespread nuclear disaster may change this answer.
Fortunately, that day is not yet here. The answer to the
second question is much the same: its day has not yet
come. Those who seek an automatic (and expanding) way
to finance aid to developing countries are no more likely
to find general acceptance of explicitly redistributive
global taxation now than they were half a century ago
when attention began to be paid to this question.
The most critical of the three questions is the last, which
is both more subtle and more important. Here, although
the answer is less clear, it may well be that there are
indeed instances in which a harmonized global tax
approach may be both sensible and feasible – perhaps
in particular with respect to controlling carbon emissions
and, less clearly, perhaps also with respect to reducing
international financial instability. However, since even
economically sensible and technically feasible solutions
to real global problems need widespread political
support, the world seems still to be some distance
away from having established the conditions needed for
success even in these limited areas.
International finance, like international trade, is a matter
of global concern. Everyone, though to varying degrees,
is affected over time by how well the system works.
Governments that care about the well-being of their
citizens have an interest in ensuring that market decisions
take externalities into account to a greater extent than
has been evident in recent years. Decades of effort
have gone into building the existing complex system of
regulating both trade and finance – the one that many
now think has not done a very good job. Decades more
may be needed to figure out how best to improve that
system and to implement such improvements. One
component of the answer may in the end be at least some
limited form of global taxation or, more likely, relatively
coordinated uniform national taxation. Absent further
crisis-driven stimulus, however, it seems unlikely that any

For the most recent such rules, see http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3.htm.
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real global FTT will emerge in the near future. Instead,
what seems more probably is further evolution of the role
of institutions like the IMF and other international ‘soft
regulatory’ bodies combined with even closer attention
to coordinating national financial regulatory systems
(such as the Basle capital requirement rules).83 Countries
may of course continue to impose various forms of FTT
for their own reasons but such taxes are unlikely to have
very dramatic effects and are in any case not global in any
meaningful sense.
More critically, more almost certainly needs to be done
to deal with climate change that according to most
evidence appears to arise in part at least from the ways
in which we use the earth’s resources. Unfortunately,
apart from the not very successful Kyoto starting
point, surprisingly little has yet been done to develop
institutions responsible for, let alone capable of, dealing
with this complex set of problems. To the extent actions
have been taken they have generally followed the path
of regulation rather than taxation, and this is likely to
continue to be the case in the future (Baumert 1998).
From a fiscal perspective, however, the most obvious
way to proceed is, first, to reduce the surprising extent
to which even very poor countries continue to squander
scarce budgetary resources on clearly inefficient and
almost always inequitable subsidies to fossil fuel
consumption (McLure 2013), and, second, to focus on
developing more coordinated national levies on carbon
emissions, perhaps supported by soft law frameworks
like those that now underlie the international tax system
– frameworks that are essentially voluntarily enforced
by countries acting in their own interests (Eccleston
2012). As and when countries decide to reduce carbon
emissions, the economically preferable way to do so is to
increase the rate of effective taxation on activities that
generate negative externalities so that people face the
real social costs of their choices, whether about where to
invest or what to consume.
On the other hand, although almost everyone likes to
tax the very rich (except, one assumes, the very rich
themselves) almost no one wants to see outsiders taxing
their rich so there is little political support – or indeed
economic rationale -- for such ideas as global wealth taxes.
Nonetheless, a few limited ideas for more coordinated
(global) taxes may have some merit, for example, with
respect to the taxation on international transportation
of goods and people and perhaps even (at the regional

level) excise taxation on such ‘sin’ goods as tobacco and
alcohol. These two cases are very different, however.
Any significant tax increases on shipping and aviation
would require a considerable degree of international
agreement to be effective, even if the revenue accrues
strictly to the taxing nations, but to the extent such taxes
have the same externality rationale as carbon taxes they
make economic sense (Keen, Parry and Strand 2013). On
the other hand, while it may be a good idea on economic
grounds to increase taxes on so-called ‘sin’ goods and on
administrative grounds to coordinate such increases at
least with neighboring countries, there is no plausible
argument for any but national taxes on such goods. Pleas
to impose special global taxes on such goods, with the
proceeds to be channelled to international agencies and
earmarked for specific worthy causes, have no economic
rationale and seem likely to have as little political traction
in the future as they have had in the past.
Most of the controversy about global taxation revolves
around three central issues: the economics of the idea,
whether it can be implemented effectively or not, and its
distributional effects. The economic arguments for taxes
(or equivalent regulations) to induce market decisionmakers to make more efficient decisions with respect
to carbon emissions or (considerably less certainly)
financial structures are generally sound. The extent to
which such ideas can be implemented effectively through
coordinated national activities or soft international
arrangements has been less explored but at least in
these two cases it may perhaps be possible over time
-- with enough effort and no doubt after many failed
negotiations -- to reach a ‘soft’ solution through largely
voluntary cooperation and coordination that would be
an improvement on the existing situation. Since in a
sense everybody at some level and in some degree has
something to gain from resolving these problems, the
world as a whole, fragmented and contentious as it is,
may perhaps at some stage and in some manner be able
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to work out some way of accomplishing these goals that
will be broadly acceptable at least to the main players -that is, those whose cooperation is essential to reaching
the intended goal. Or at least that is what one must hope
since this appears to be about all one can expect from
the world we live in short of some cataclysmic crisis.
However, no matter how desirable one may think it
to be for the rich to be taxed to help the poor, major
redistributive proposals for global taxation are unlikely to
be accepted. One may wish that such schemes existed
for ethical reasons as well as for such consequential
reasons as (perhaps) improved world stability. But one
cannot realistically expect them to be accepted unless
and until at least most people in most major countries
truly accept that they are part of a larger world polity. If
and when that time ever comes, prescribing a sensible
world tax system will not pose any insuperable economic
or technical issues. Until then, however, we will have
to continue to struggle along with the patched-up and
partial international system we now have, modified from
time to time as new players and new interests enter
the decision-making group and as that group faces new
realities. If and when that system reaches a sustainable
and inclusive agreement about how to treat crossborder transactions, the possible basis for a more global
approach to financing global public goods may at last
exist. Until then, however, those who would make the
world a better place seem best advised to focus more
on improving the information and evidence needed for
better domestic policy decisions in light of a realistic
appraisal of world realities. The alternative approach of
proposing radical reforms – mirages - that are not going
to be accepted runs the risk of making it too easy to
neglect the hard and necessary work of working out how
the world as a whole can possibly cope with some of the
real, complex, contested and changing problems raised
in the global tax literature.

References
Agosin, M. and R. Ffrench-Davis (1996) “Measuring
Capital Inflows in Latin America,” in M. ul Haq, I. Kaul and
I. Grunberg, eds., The Tobin Tax: Coping with Financial
Viability (New York: Oxford University Press), 161-191.
Allan, E. (2012) The Illicit Trade in Tobacco Products and
How to Handle It. 2nd ed; Washington. International Tax
and Investment Center.
Alvaredo, F. et al. (2013) “The Top 1 Percent in
International and Historical Perspective.” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 27(3): 3-20.
Alworth, J. and G. Arachi, eds. (2012) Taxation and the
Financial Crisis (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Anayati, S. (2012) The ‘Resource Curse’ and the Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), Dissertation
submitted for MA/MSc degree in Geopolitics, Territory &
Security at King’s College London, available here.
ArthaKraniti (2013) Exploring ArthaKranti: A Path to
Fiscal Consolidation, ArthaKraniti Research Project
Team, ArthaKraniti Pratishthan, Maharashtra Knowledge
Corporation, Mumbai, March. Available here.
Ashmore, R. L. Jussim, and D. Wilder (2001) Social
Identity, Intergroup Conflict and Conflict Reduction
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Avi-Yonah, R. (2007) International Tax as International
Law: An Analysis of the International Tax Regime.
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Avi-Yonah, R. (2011) “Taxation as Regulation: Carbon Tax,
Health Care Tax, Bank Tax and Other Regulatory Taxes.”
Journal of Accounting, Economics, and Law, 1 (1): Article
6.
Bahl, R. (1971) “A Regression Approach to Tax Effort and
Tax Ratio Analysis,” International Monetary Fund Staff
Papers, 18 (3): 570-612.
Bahl, R. (1972) “A Representative Tax System Approach
to Measuring Tax Effort in Developing Countries,”
International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 19 (1): 87-124.
Barrett, S. (2007) Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply
Global Public Goods (New York: Oxford University Press).
Baumert, K. (1998) Global Taxes and Fees: Recent
Developments and Overcoming Obstacles, Global Policy
Forum, available here.
Beitler, D. (2010) Raising Revenue: A Review of Financial
Transaction Taxes throughout the World, a report for
Health Poverty Action and Stamp Out Poverty available
here.
38

Bhagwati, J. and W. Dellafar (1973) “The Brain Drain and
Income Taxation,” World Development 1 (1-2): 91-104.
Bhagwati, J. and J. Wilson, eds. (1989) Income Taxation
and International Mobility (Cambridge MA: MIT Press).
Bierbrauer, F. (2012) On the Incidence of a Financial
Transaction Tax in a Model with Fire Sales, CESifo Working
Paper No. 3870, June.
Bird, R. and D. Brean (1986) “The Interjurisdictional
Allocation of Income and the Unitary Tax Debate”,
Canadian Tax Journal, 34 (6): 1377-1416.
Bird, R. and J. Jun (2007) “Earmarking in Theory and
Korean Practice,” in S. Phua, ed., Excise Taxation in Asia
(Singapore: National University of Singapore, 2007).
Bird, R. and E. Slack (2013) Local Taxes and Local
Expenditures: Strengthening the Wicksellian Connection,
International Center for Public Policy, Andrew Young
School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University,
Working Paper 13-22, August.
Bird, R. and S. Wilkie (2013) “Designing Tax Policy:
Constraints and Objectives in an Open Economy,”
eJournal of Tax Research, 11 (3): 284-320.
Bird, R. and E. Zolt (2005) “Redistribution via Taxation: The
Limited Role of the Personal Income Tax in Developing
Countries,” UCLA Law Review, 52 (6, 2005): 1627-95.
Bird, R. and E. Zolt (2013) Taxation, Inequality, and
Fiscal Contracting in the Americas, UCLA School of Law
Research Paper 13-14, September.
Brondolo, J. (2011) Taxing Financial Transactions: An
Assessment of Administrative Feasability, IMF Working
Paper 11/185, August.
Brooks, K. (2009) “Inter-Nation Equity: The Development
of an Important but Underappreciated International
Tax Policy Objective,” in J. Head and R. Krever, eds., Tax
Reform in the 21st Century (Austin TX: Wolters Kluwer).
Brzoska, M. (2004) “Taxation of the Global Arms Trade?
An Overview of the Issues,” Kyklos, 37 (2): 149-170.
Buch, C., B. Hilberg and L. Tonzer (2014) Taxing Banks:
An Evaluation of the German Bank Levy, CESifo Working
Paper No. 4704, February.
Casal, P. (2011) “Global Taxes on Natural Resources,”
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 8: 307-327.
Christian Aid (2013) Christian Aid’s Tax Justice Strategy
2013-2016, available here.

Cintra, M. (2009). Bank transactions: pathway to the
single tax ideal. São Paulo: Cyan Artes Gráficas.
Cline, W. (1979) “Resource Transfers to the Developing
Countries: Issues and Trends,” in Cline, ed., Policy
Alternatives for a New International Economic Order
(New York: Praeger Publishers), 333-353.
Cockfield, A., ed. (2010) Globalization and Its Tax
Discontents: Tax Policy and International Investments
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press).
Coelho, I. (2009) Taxing Bank Transactions – The
Experience in Latin America and Elsewhere, September.
Available here.
Commission of the European Communities (2005) An
Analysis of a Possible Contribution based on Airline Tickets
as a New Source of Financing Development, Commission
Staff Working Paper SEC (2005) 733, Brussels, June.
Congdon, W., J. Kling and S. Mullainathan (2011) Policy
and Choice: Public Finance through the Lens of Behavioral
Economics (Washington: The Brookings Institution).
Coons, C. (2001) “Wellman’s ‘Reductive’ Justification for
Redistributive Policies that Favor Compatriots,” Ethics,
111 (4): 782-788.
Cooper, R. (1977) “The Ocean as a Source of Revenue,” in
J. Bhagwati, ed., The New International Economic Order:
The North-South Debate (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press),
105-110.
Cordell, A. and T. Ide (1997) The New Wealth of Nations:
Taxing Cyberspace (Toronto: Between the Lines).
Coutinho, M. (2012) “Brazil: Understand the Tax
on Financial Operations,” International Tax Review,
September 6, available here.
Credit Suisse (2013) Regulatory Update, July 2013 –
Financial Transaction Taxes. Available here.
Damette, O. (2013) Mixture distribution hypothesis and
the impact of a Tobin tax on exchange rate volatility: a
reassessment, Document de Travail No. 2013-07, Faculté
des sciences économiques et de gestion, Université de
Lorraine and Université de Strasbourg, May, available
here.
Davies, J., ed. (2008) Personal Wealth from a Global
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

39

Dosser, D. (1963) “Allocating the Burden of International
Aid to Less Developed Countries,” Review of Economics
and Statistics, 45 (2): 207-209.
Eccleston, R. (2012) The Dynamics of Global Economic
Governance: The Financial Crisis, the OECD and the
Politics of International Tax Cooperation (Cheltenham
UK: Edward Elgar).
Edgar, T. (2013) Corrective Taxation, Leverage, and
Compensation in a Bloated Financial Sector, October,
available here.
Eichengreen, B. (1996) “The Tobin Tax: What Have We
Learned?” in M. ul Haq, I. Kaul and I. Grunberg, eds.,
The Tobin Tax: Coping with Financial Viability (New York:
Oxford University Press), 275-287.
ECLAC (2011) Global Tax on Financial Transactions is a
Priority for Stability and Development, Press Release,
United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America
and the Caribbean, August 24.
Engelbrecht, H. and F. Hanighen (1934) The Merchants of
Death (New York: Dodd, Mead).
European Commission (2010) Financial Sector Taxation,
Taxation Papers (Brussels)
European Union (EU) (2008) European Union Public
Finance. 4th ed. (Luxembourg).
Fairless, T. (2013) “EU Financial-Transactions Tax Faces
More Delays,” Wall Street Journal, December 1.
Fennochietto, R. and C. Pessino (2013) Understanding
Countries’ Tax Effort, IMF Working Paper, WP/13/244,
November.
Fox, W. (2012) “Retail Sales and Use Taxation,” in R. Ebel
and J. Petersen, eds., The Oxford Handbook of State and
Local Government Finance (Oxford University Press),
406-428.
Frankman, Myron J. (1996) “International taxation: The
Trajectory of an Idea from Lorimer to Brandt,” World
Development, 24(5): 807-820.
Fricke, D. and T. Lux (2013) The Effects of a Financial
Transaction Tax in an Artificial Financial Market, Kiel
Working Paper, Kiel Institute for the World Economy,
August.

Davis, L. (2014) “Pricing Energy Efficiently,” NBER
Reporter, No. 1, 8-10.

Fuest, C. and A. Piechl (2012) “European Fiscal Union:
What is it? Does it work? And are there really no
Alternatives?” CESifo Forum, 13 (2): 3-9.

Doernberg, R., et al. (2001) Electronic Commerce and
Multi-Jurisdictional Taxation (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International).

Gillenwater, M. (2013) The Treaty Compliance Challenge:
Enforcement under the Kyoto Protocol, February 10,
available here.

Gradstein, M. and K. Konrad, eds. (2006) Institutions and
Norms in Economic Development (Cambridge MA: MIT
Press).
Grinberg, I. (2013) “Taxing Capital Income in Emerging
Countries: Will FACTA Open the Door?” World Tax
Journal, October, 325-367.
Griffith-Jones, S. and A. Persaud (2012) Financial
Transactions Taxes, available here.
Haq, M. (1976) The Poverty Curtain: Choices for the Third
World (New York: Columbia University Press).
Haq, M, I. Kaul, and I. Grunberg, eds. (1996) The Tobin
Tax: Coping with Financial Volatility (Oxford: Oxford
University Press).
Harrison, K. (2013) The Political Economy of British
Columbia’s Carbon Tax, OECD Environment Working
Papers No. 63.
Herman, B. (2012) Half a Century of Proposals for
‘Innovative’ Development Financing, Background Paper,
World Economic and Social Survey 2012, available here.
Hirschman, A. (1991) The Rhetoric of Reaction (Cambridge,
MA: Belknap Press).
Hirschman, A. and R. Bird (1968) Foreign Aid - A Critique
and A Proposal. Essays in International Finance No. 69
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University).
Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) (2008) Annual
Review of Development Effectiveness: Shared Global
Challenges (Washington: World Bank).
Institute of International Finance (2013) The Proposed
EU Financial Transaction Tax: Potential Harm to Savers,
Pensioners and Global Capital Markets, IIF Council for
Asset and Investment Management (CAIM) EU-11 FTT
Position Paper, April 23.
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2010) Dimensions of Tax
Design: The Mirrlees Review (Oxford UK: Oxford
University Press).
Institute for Fiscal Studies (2011) Tax by Design: The
Mirrlees Review (Oxford UK: Oxford University Press).
Interagency Working Group (IAWG) (2013) Technical
Support Document: Technical Update of the Social Cost
of Carbon for Regulatory Impact Analysis Under Executive
Order 12866, Interagency Working Group on Social Cost
of Carbon, United States Government, May.
IMF (2010) A Fair and Substantial Contribution by the
Financial Sector, Final Report for the G-20, Washington,
June.
IMF (2013) Energy Subsidy Reform: Lessons and
Implications, Washington, January 28.
40

Ip, G. (2013) “The Gated Globe,” Special Report, The
Economist, October 12.
ITIC (2013) Are Earmarked Taxes on Alcohol and Tobacco
a Good Idea? Evidence from Asia. Special Report,
International Tax and Investment Center, Washington,
September.
Jha, P. and R. Pelo (2014) “Global Effects of Smoking, of
Quitting, and of Taxing Tobacco,” New England Journal of
Medicine, 370: 60-68.
Kaufman, D., E. McGuirk, and P. Vicente (2012) By the
People? Foreign Aid and Donor-Country Democracy,
available here.
Kaul, I. (2012) “International Public Finance,” available
here.
Kaul, I. and K. Le Goulven (2003) “Financing Global Public
Goods: A New Function of Public Finance,” in Kaul et al.,
Providing Global Public Goods.
Kaul, I., I. Grunberg, and M. Stern, eds. (1999) Global
Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st
Century (New York: Oxford University Press for the United
Nations Development Programme).
Kaul, I., P. Conceicao, K. Le Goulven, and R. Mendoza,
eds. (2002) Providing Global Public Goods: Managing
Globalization (New York: Oxford University Press for the
United Nations Development Programme)).
Kaul, I. and P. Conceicao (2006) The New Public Finance:
Responding to Global Challenges (New York: Oxford
University Press for the United Nations Development
Programme).
Keen, M., I. Parry and J. Strand (2013) “Planes, Ships and
Taxes,” Economic Policy, 28 (76): 703-749.
Kelton, M. (2008) “Public Policy Implications of Tobacco
Industry Smuggling through Native American Reserves,”
International Journal of Health Services, 30(3): 411-417.
Keohane, N. (2009) “Cap and Trade, Rehabilitated:
Tradable Permits to Control U.S. Greenhouse Gas,”
Review of Environmental Economics and Policy, 3(1): 4267.
Krasner, S. (1982) “Structural Causes and Regime
Considerations: Regimes as Intervening Variables,
International Organization, 36(2): 185-205.
Lang, M. and J. Owens (2013) The Role of Tax Treaties
in Facilitating Development and Protecting the Tax Base,
WU International Taxation Research Paper Series, No.
2014-13.
Lewis, M. (2013) “IMF’s Carbon Tax Shenanigans: Part II,”
posted on Master Resource, a free-market energy blog,
April 10, 2013, available here.

Mahoney, J. (2012) Conceptualizing and Explaining
Punctuated versus Incremental Change, available here.

OECD (2013) Addressing Base Erosion and Profits Shifting
(Paris)

Martin, R., M. Muuls, and U. Wagner (2012) An Evidence
Review of the EU Emissions Trading System, Focussing
on Effectiveness of the System in Driving Industrial
Abatement. London: Department of Energy & Climate
Change.

OECD (2013a) Action Plan for Base Erosion and Profits
Shifting (Paris: OECD)

Masciandro, D. and F. Passarelli (2012) “Regulation and
Taxation: Economics and Politics,” in Alworth and Arachi
(2012), pp. 257-269.
McCullagh, D. and L. Downes (2012) U.N. could tax U.S.based Web sites, leaked docs show, CNET News, June ,
available here.
McKinnon, R. (2012) The Conservative Case for a Wealth
Tax, Wall Street Journal, January 16, available here.
McLure, C. (2013) Reforming Subsidies to Fossil Fuel
Consumption: Killing Several Birds with One Stone,
ISPWP 13-12, Andrew Young School of Policy Studies,
Georgia State University, April.
McMahon, F. (2001) A Global Tax: Unworkable,
Unnecessary and Dangerous, Fraser Institute, Vancouver,
June, available here.
Mendez, R. (1992) International Public Finance: A New
Perspective on Global Relations (Oxford University Press).
Mendez, R. (1997) “Financing the United Nations and the
International Public Sector,” Global Governance, 3: 283310.

OECD (2013c) Climate and Carbon: Aligning Prices and
Policies, OECD Environment Policy Paper, October.
Oliver Wyman (2012) Proposed EU Commission Financial
Transaction Tax Impact Analysis on Exchange Markets,
January.
Otsuka, Y. and B. Braun (2002) “Taxation by Regulation:
The Case of Local Cable TV Regulation,” Review of
Industrial Organization, 21 (1): 21-40.
Oxfam (2011) Out of the Bunker: Time for a Fair Deal
on Shipping Emissions, Oxfam and World Wildlife Fund
Briefing Note, September, available here.
Paul, J. and K. Wahlberg (2002) Global Taxes for Global
Priorities, Global Policy forum, March, available here.
Picciotto, S. (1992) International Business Taxation
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson).
Picciotto, S. (2013) Is the International Tax System
Fit for Purpose, Especially for Developing Countries?
International Centre for Tax and Development, Working
Paper 13, September.
Pigou, A. (1920) The Economics of Welfare (London:
Macmillan).

Mendez, R. (2001) The Case for Global Taxes: An Overview,
Paper presented to United Nations ad hoc Expert Group
Meeting on Innovations in Mobilizing Global Resources
for Development, New York, June, available here.

Piketty, T. (2014) Capital in the 21st Century (Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press).

Michalos, A. (1997) Good Taxes: The Case for Taxing
Foreign Currency Exchange and Other Financial
Transactions (Toronto: Dundurn Press).

Pogge, T. (2011) “Allowing the Poor to Share the Earth,”
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 8: 335-352.

Miller, S. and M. Vela (2013) Are Environmentally Related
Taxes Effective?, IDB Working Paper No. IDB-WP-467,
Inter-American Development Bank, November.
Morozov, E. (2013) To Save Everything, Click Here (New
York: Public Affairs).
Munk School of Global Affairs (2013) G8 The UK Summit:
Lough Erne, Toronto, June.
Nordhaus, W. (2011) “The Architecture of Climate
Economics: Designing a Global Agreement on Global
Warming,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 67 (1): 9-18.
OECD (2010) Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises and Tax Administrations (Paris).
41

OECD (2013b) Revenue Statistics 1965-2012 (Paris, 2013).

Pogge, T. (2008) World Poverty and Human Rights
(Cambridge: Polity Press).

Posner, R. (1971) “Taxation by Regulation,” Bell Journal of
Economics 2(1): 22-50.
PwC Financial Services (2013) EU Bonus Update, FS
Regulatory Brief, May, available here.
Rajan, R. (2003) Taxing International Currency Flows:
A Financial Safeguard or Financial Bonanza? School of
Economics, University of Adelaide, April, available here.
Rogoff, K. (2010) “IMF Proposals get the Big Picture
Right,” The Guardian, May 1.
Sandler, T. (1997) Global Challenges: An Approach
to Environmental, Political and Economic Problems
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Sandler, T. (1998) “Global and Regional Public Goods: A
Prognosis for Collective Action,” Fiscal Studies, 19 (3):
221-247.
Sandler, T. (2001) Economic Concepts for the Social
Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
Sandler, T. (2002) “Financing International Public
Goods,” in M. Ferroni and A. Mody, eds., International
Public Goods: Incentives, Measurement and Financing
(Dordrecht, NL: Kluwer), 81-118.
Schafer, D. (2012) ‘Financial Transaction Tax Contributes
to More Sustainability in Financial Markets,”
Intereconomics, 2012/2: 76-83.
Schulmeister, S. (2012) “A General Financial Transaction
Tax: Strong Pros, Weak Cons,” Intereconomics, 2012/2:
84-89.
Seely, A. (2013) Taxation of Banking, Standard Note
SN5251, House of Commons Library, July.
Seers, D. (1964) “International Aid: The Next Steps,”
Journal of Modern African Studies, 2 (4): 471-489.
Selbervik, H. and K. Nygaaard (2006) Nordic Exceptionalism
in Development Assistance: Aid Policies and the Major
Donors: the Nordic Countries, CMI Report R2006:8, Chr.
Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway, available here.
Sen, A. (1999) “Global Justice; Beyond International
Equity,” in Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, Global Public Goods,
116-115.
Shaviro, D. (2014) Fixing U.S. International Taxation
(Oxford: Oxford University Press).
Shome, P. (1995) Global Taxes, Working Paper No. 5,
National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New
Delhi, November.
Shome, P. and J. Stotsky (1995) Financial Transactions
Taxes, IMF Working Paper WP/95/77, August.
Siebert, A. (2013) “The European Commission’s Proposed
Financial Transactions Tax,” EconoMonitor, April 27, 2013.
Spahn, P. (1995) International Financial Flows and
Transactions Taxes: Survey and Options, IMF Working
Paper WP/95/60, June.
Steinberg, E., J. Yager, and G. Brannon (1978) New Means
of Financing International Needs (Washington: Brookings
Institution).
Steiner, H. (2011) “The Global Fund: A Reply to Casal,”
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 8: 328-334.
Stubbs, D. (2012) Adopting a Currency Transaction
Tax when Avoidance is a Possibility: Which Currencies
would take the Lead and What Rate could they Charge?
Background Paper for World Economic and Social Survey
42 2012.

Tanzi, V. (1995) Taxation in an Integrating World
(Washington: Brookings Institution).
Taskforce (2010) Globalizing Solidarity: the Case for
Financial Levies, Report of the Committee of Experts to
the Taskforce on International Financial Transactions and
Development, Paris. Available here.
Thuronyi, V. (2010) “Tax Treaties and Developing
Countries,” in M. Lang et al., ed., Tax Treaties: Building
Bridges between Law and Economics (Amsterdam: IBFD),
441-456.
Tobin, J. (1974) The New Economics One Decade Older,
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
Tobin, J. (1978) “A Proposal for International Monetary
Reform,” Eastern Economic Journal, 4(3-4): 153-159
TUAC Secretariat (2010) The Parameters of a Financial
Transaction Tax and the OECD Global Public Good
Resource Gap, 2010-2020, Trade Union Advisory
Committee to the OECD, Paris.
United Nations (1970) Towards Accelerated Development:
Proposals for the Second United Nations Development
Decade. Committee for Development Planning. New
York: United Nations.
United Nations (2006) Social Justice in an Open World
(New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs,
United Nations).
United Nations (2012) World Economic and Social Survey
2012 (New York).
Vella, J. (2012) “The Financial Transaction Tax: Some
Questionable Claims,” Interconomics, 2012/2: 90-95.
Vivid Economics (2012) Carbon Taxation and Fiscal
Consolidation: The Potential of Carbon Pricing to Reduce
Europe’s Fiscal Deficits. Report prepared for the European
Climate Foundation and Green Budget Europe, May,
available here.
Wahlberg, K. (2005) Progress on Global Taxes?, Global
Policy Forum, December, available here.
Wellman, C. (2000) “Relational Facts in Liberal Political
Theory: Is There Magic in the Pronoun ‘My’?” Ethics,
110(3): 537-562.
Wilson, J. (2008) “A Voluntary Brain-Drain Tax, “ Journal
of Public Economics, 92 (12):2385-2391.
World Bank (2013) Mapping Carbon Price Initiatives:
Developments and Prospects. Washington, May.
World Health Organization (WHO) (2009) Public Health,
Innovation and Intellectual Property: Report of the Expert
Working Group on Research and Development Financing,
EB 126/6 Add.1

World Health Organization (WHO) (2012) Draft
Guidelines for the Implementation of Article 6 of the
WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control: Report
of the Working Group, FCTTC/COP/5/8
Wyplosz, C. (1999) “International Financial Instability,” in
Kaul, Grunberg and Stern, Global Public Goods, pp. 152189.
Zivin, J. and M. Neidell (2013) “Environment, Health, and
Human Capital,” Journal of Economic Literature, 51 (3):
689-730.

43

